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FIELD NOTES
Having just returned from five months of educational 
leave, I am energized and even more passionate about 
the work we have ahead of us. During my time away, I 
had an opportunity to study the terror that landmines 
caused civilians during the 1943–1944 Italian campaign 
and how those mines were cleared. They are stories not 
dissimilar from today’s conflicts, including in Yemen. 
On 13 June, the Embassy of the Republic of Yemen held a landmine briefing on 
Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., during which I presented on the country’s 
survivor assistance needs and Associate Director, Suzanne Fiederlein, served 
as the event’s moderator.
In looking toward CISR’s work over the next few months, from 16 
September to 4 October, we will hold our 15th Senior Managers’ Course (SMC) 
in Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) at our home base of James 
Madison University (JMU) in the beautiful Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. 
CISR, working in close collaboration with faculty from JMU’s College of 
Business, specializes in management training for leaders in humanitarian 
mine action (HMA) and CWD around the world, including participants from 
Iraq, Libya, and Syria, an area of focus for this issue of The Journal.  
We are pleased to have a number of extraordinary articles focused on the 
Middle East, beginning with a call to action by HRH Prince Mired R. Z. Al-
Hussein titled, “The Challenge of Managing Mine Action in Jordan.” In his 
editorial, Prince Mired outlines how Jordan embraced national ownership in 
its work to rid itself of landmines despite significant challenges, and discusses 
the country’s future efforts of focusing on victim assistance, mine risk edu-
cation, and training. Turning our attention to Iraq, Dr. Mark Wilkinson of 
the United Nations Mine Action Service presents two outstanding articles on 
IEDs in ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ environments, focusing on the urban areas of 
Fallujah and Mosul. Continuing with our focus on Iraq, we feature a photo es-
say by Sean Sutton on MAG’s work in the country, which highlights in-depth, 
personal interviews with Iraqis affected by landmines. And finally, we feature 
an article by Henrique Garbino (FSD) on the effects of landmines on food se-
curity in Lebanon, highlighting that access denial to agricultural land and the 
financial burdens born by the government are the most significant challenges 
to food production in the country.
In addition, we feature articles on the safe and secure management of am-
munition. The first article is from Matthias Krötz and Joseph Farha (BICC) 
on the need to develop national and regional capacities, and the second from 
Nora Allgaier and Samuel Paunila (GICHD) on the global challenge of man-
aging ammunition stockpiles. Additionally, we feature an article from Roly 
Evans (GICHD) and David Hewitson (Fenix Insight) about the need to stan-
dardize key performance indicators in HMA, as well as an article from Robert 
Syfret and Chris Cooper from The HALO Trust that provides broader practi-
cal information for mine action operators on the use of thermite at field and 
program levels.
As we look ahead, I will be attending and participating in the  Global 
Conference on Assistance to Victims of Anti-Personnel Mines and Other 
Explosive Remnants of War, and on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
in Amman, Jordan from 10–12 September, which is a focus for our upcoming 
calls for papers. For more information on future topics of discussion or for in-
formation about The Journal, please email enquiries to: cisr-journal@jmu.edu.
Ken Rutherford,
CISR Director
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Over the course of two decades, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan worked diligently to rid itself of landmines despite monumental challenges. In com-
parison to other mine-affected countries, the difficulties that 
Jordan faced may have been miniscule, but for a developing 
country with minimal natural resources in a very volatile re-
gion of the world, the task was enormous. The initial estimate 
of landmines buried in Jordanian territory was over 300,000, 
the vast majority of which were laid by the Jordanian mili-
tary along the kingdom’s western border after the 1967 Arab–
Israeli War and along its northern border after the Syrian 
incursion into Jordan in 1970.
The simplest answer to the frequently posed question: 
“How did Jordan manage to do it given the circumstances?” is 
national ownership. Jordan embraced the notion wholeheart-
edly and strived to fulfill the obligations as set forth in the 
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). However, 
what worked in Jordan might not necessarily work elsewhere. 
Embracing ownership will not guarantee that resources will 
flow in response to needs, although it significantly encour-
ages cooperation between those with needs and those in a 
position to provide assistance. This was very much the case 
vis-à-vis Jordan. 
When I first started working on this issue in late 2004, 
the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation 
(NCDR) was in a difficult situation. The NCDR had been es-
tablished in 2000, but there was little funding from donor 
countries, and the organization was struggling to survive. 
After changing the board and selecting a new national direc-
tor, I worked on formulating a national mine action plan with 
all the relevant stakeholders and made sure that it accommo-
dated Jordan’s overall national plan for development. Next we 
called for a general meeting with all of our potential donors 
and explained to them in detail what we hoped to achieve. 
After a great deal of discussion and negotiation, the European 
Union (EU) decided that it would “go out on a limb” and sup-
port us in demining a certain area in the northern part of the 
Jordan Valley. 
From that point forward, things began to take off. Over 
the following years, 24 donor nations and entities provided 
US$44 million in funding for Jordan to conduct clearance, 
training in all aspects, capacity development, mine risk ed-
ucation (MRE), survey, monitoring, advocacy, and survivor 
assistance. However, we quickly realized that if we relied sole-
ly on Jordan’s Royal Engineers to conduct the demining, the 
task would take much longer and completion would remain a 
distant dream. Hence, the NCDR made the strategic decision 
to invite an international operator to assist with clearance ef-
forts. In 2006, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) dramatically 
changed the situation in Jordan. NPA’s contribution expedit-
ed demining and put Jordan on a trajectory toward success.
As Chairman of the NCDR, I tried to imbue upon my staff 
the imperativeness of doing things correctly. Our challenge 
was to create a viable, credible, and effective civilian national 
authority from scratch. This could only be achieved by persis-
tently overcoming our challenges and bureaucratic difficulties, 
garnering community support and involvement, and creating 
and fostering information networks and donor partnerships. 
Maintaining transparency with stakeholders and partners 
helped foster relationships based on trust and confidence. This 
The Challenge  of 
Managing Mine Action
by HRH Prince Mired R. Z. Al-Hussein [ Chairman of the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation, 
Jordan and Special Envoy of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention ]
EDITORIAL
in  Jordan
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was all achieved through the hard work and political will of 
His Majesty the King, the Prime Minister, the relevant minis-
ters, the Chief of Staff, and everyone else involved down to the 
deminer in the field. I wholeheartedly encourage mine-affect-
ed countries not to be despondent about the circumstances at 
hand, despite the challenges, but rather adopt the right attitude 
and muster the will to get the job done. The fundamentals of 
conducting a successful mine action program are well known 
and should be pursued with gusto.
Despite the tremendous efforts of our Royal Engineers and 
NPA, Jordan applied in 2008 for an extension to the Article 
5 deadline, as the clearance of the northern border was tak-
ing much longer than we had initially anticipated. The States 
Parties approved this request, and Jordan, again with NPA’s 
support, was granted an additional three years to complete 
the task, which it did by the spring of 2012. 
A great testimony to the professionalism of NPA and the 
Jordanians who worked on the clearance of our northern bor-
der was the fact that there were no reported injuries among 
the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees that fled Syria 
on foot post-2012, as a result of the internal conflict brought 
on by the Arab Spring. These poor, traumatized human be-
ings streamed across our northern border from all directions; 
over areas that had recently been densely contaminated with 
landmines. The question that bears asking is, what would have 
happened to all these innocent lives had we not cleared our 
border in time? Would they have risked breaching our mine-
fields to save their own lives? The answer is most likely “yes.” 
Additionally, and as a further consequence of our commit-
ment to owning the problem, we conducted a desk study to 
review the demining that was done by our military, primar-
ily during the pre-Ottawa Convention period and after, in the 
Jordan Valley. The military did a phenomenal job in clearing 
vast areas, but during the early and mid-90s, there were neither 
international nor national demining standards. Hence, we 
were confronted with the dilemma of whether to go back and 
take another look at these areas that were officially declared 
cleared, and that were being cultivated by farmers and used 
for various purposes. In 2009, we decided that it was our re-
sponsibility to ensure the areas were indeed cleared. As a result 
of our increased capacity, technical expertise, and newly es-
tablished national standards, we closely examined the “old ex-
minefields” to see if any additional action would be necessary. 
We called this endeavor the Sampling and Verification 
Project, as we were unsure what we would discover. The 
old ex-minefields were cleared and the lands were being 
utilized, but there was a discrepancy in many areas be-
tween the number of landmines originally laid and those 
demined. After an initial assessment of the situation, we de-
termined that the right thing to do was to authorize fur-
ther investigation. We nevertheless took on this challenge 
with vigor and expended a big effort to verify that the mine-
fields that were declared clear some 14 years earlier by our 
military were in fact clear and if any further measures were 
necessary, to conduct clearance expeditiously. Despite tre-
mendous financial obstacles, the project was finally com-
pleted during the early summer of 2018.
As for victim assistance (VA), Jordan adopted a two-track 
policy by addressing the needs of landmine and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) survivors on the one hand while 
also promoting the rights of all persons with disabilities in 
the kingdom more broadly. The needs of survivors are sub-
stantial and can always use more direct support. Despite this 
challenge and the limited funding available, Jordan has never-
theless afforded the vast number of landmine and ERW survi-
vors, especially the most difficult and complicated cases, with 
genuine support over the years. This is done through micro-
credit projects, securing employment, material and financial 
A map of mined areas in Jordan that appeared in Issue 5.3 
of The Journal in 2001.
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assistance, counseling, physical rehabilitation, providing 
prostheses, and other types of social support. 
In 2017, Jordan enacted Law Number 20 for “The Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.” This law is the most progressive hu-
man rights-based legislation in our region of the Middle East. 
The articles in the law are cross-cutting and place obligations 
on most of the government ministries vis-à-vis education, 
health, diagnostic testing, accessibility, voting, employment, 
deinstitutionalization of persons with disabilities, and their 
integration and inclusion into society, etc. The challenge at the 
moment is one of implementation. The legal framework is in 
place, political will stands firm, awareness of the rights of per-
sons with disabilities in general is more widespread, and yet 
implementation of the law is taking time due to financial con-
straints. Hopefully, with the support of our donor friends and 
partners we will be able to make headway on these issues in 
the near future, whereby our landmine and ERW survivors—
and all persons with disabilities and their families in the king-
dom—will feel that their lives have changed for the better.
In conclusion, I would like to reaffirm my country’s un-
yielding commitment to this noble cause. Even though we de-
clared completion in 2012, we still remain active in mine 
action. We hope to focus our efforts in the near future on VA 
issues, MRE, and training. As I mentioned earlier, our jour-
ney in mine action started in the early 1990s and has been a 
bumpy ride at times. But with the hard work and dedication 
HRH Prince Mired R.Z. Al-Hussein
Chairman, National Committee for Demining 
and Rehabilitation, Jordan
Special envoy to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention
HRH Prince Mired R.Z. Al-Hussein is the visiting special envoy of the 
Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). He has also served 
as the chair of Jordan’s National Committee for Demining and 
Rehabilitation since 2004. After being appointed in 2009 as the spe-
cial envoy to the APMBC, he has worked extensively with the United 
Nations and member countries to promote the banning of anti-
personnel mines worldwide. In addition, since 2000 he has served 
as president of the Hashemite Charitable Society for Soldiers with 
Special Needs and is president of the Higher Council for Persons 
with Disabilities. Prince Mired has extensive military experience. 
He completed the Graduate Officers Course in Military Studies and 
Officer Training at the British Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst in 
1990. This was preceded by two years military conscription to the 
Jordanian Armed Forces (1987–1989) and followed by further ser-
vice to the Jordanian Armed Forces as Special Forces Officer (1990-
1991); and Military Intelligence Officer (1991-1994). From 1995 to 
1997 he served as Security and Intelligence Officer with Jordanian 
Security (1995–1997).
HRH Prince Mired R.Z. Al-Hussein of Jordan signing the Maputo Declaration for a Mine-Free World in 2014.
Photo courtesy of Wikipedia.
of all Jordanians who have worked tirelessly in mine action, 
the input of survivors, and the generosity of donors and part-
ners, Jordan has been able to persevere and overcome the 
challenges. 
The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of 
Conventional Weapons Destruction are those of the author(s) and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of 
State, the U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison University, 
or the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
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When in control of the area of Iraq north of Baghdad, including the city of Fallujah, ISIS prepared to defend its position from inevitable government 
counterattack through the widespread use of improvised ex-
plosive devices (IEDs) laid as defensive obstacles in patterns 
similar to conventional minefields.1 The subsequent destruc-
tion of bridges over the Tigris River further strengthened 
the ability of ISIS to defend the city and prevent the civilians 
trapped within from escaping.
Although the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) liberated Fallujah 
in May 2016, explosive hazards (EH), most significantly IEDs 
that lie as “weapons in wait,” continue the conflict today by 
depriving the Fallujah economy and society of a full recovery. 
For example, only after the removal of two submerged IEDs in 
August 2018, was the notorious Iron Bridge reopened to traf-
fic after which a two-hour detour once again became a five- 
minute trip for many accessing a nearby maternity hospital. 
Tasks. The bridge restoration is typical of so-called stabi-
lization tasks in Fallujah that focus on EH clearance need-
ed prior to restoration of essential public services and light 
infrastructure.2 In addition, so-called humanitarian tasks 
focus on clearance of IED belts composed of victim-operated 
IEDs (VOIEDs).
Recovery. Following clearance by the United Nations 
Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq, from 1 October 2016 
through 22 January 2019, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) completed 199 stabilization tasks in 
Fallujah and surrounding areas. These tasks were managed by 
the UNDP and assigned in cooperation with the Government 
of Iraq through the Funding Facility for Stability (FFS)—ef-
fectively a clearing house to assign and prioritize clearance 
tasks so as to restore key infrastructure. In addition, in co-
operation with other organizations, UNMAS completed 119 
humanitarian tasks.
Mandate. Gradual progress may not be progress enough, 
however, when considered from a public and political per-
spective leading to the urgency of a “sooner-than-later” 
mandate for those organizations including UNMAS Iraq re-
sponsible for EH clearance. Arguably, this is the critical first 
step toward follow-on timely repair of infrastructure and 
by Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]
A ‘SIMPLE’ MODEL 
FOR CLEARANCE
Image 1. A bridge over the Tigris River, 6 km north of Fallujah. ISIS destroyed the bridge to prevent civilians fleeing 
the city when the Iraqi Security Forces offensive began.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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ultimately the safe return home for the 1.8 million Iraqis still 
internally displaced, many living in camps. Such a mandate 
immediately leads to practical problems insofar as IED dis-
posal (IEDD) operators need to understand the threats faced 
from two aspects: type and environment.
Implications. IEDD operators must identify and classi-
fy threats, consolidate and interpret related data, and there-
by assess the threat environment. The more effectively the 
IEDD operators can draw practical conclusions about both 
the threats and the threat environments, the sooner they can 
safely commence clearance activities. Moreover, the IEDD 
community can then learn how to optimize clearance assets. 
This then leads to two questions concerning EH clearance 
in Fallujah:
1. What can the data tell us about the extent and type of 
IEDs encountered?3
2. What might the data contribute to the threat environ-
ment model?
Findings. UNMAS Iraq clearance data compiled during ac-
tivities in Fallujah leads to three conclusions key to assessing 
Figure 1. Known and suspected IED contamination around Fallujah (as of January 2019). 
Figure courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
Images 2 and 3. Typical plastic (left) and “speed bump” (right) main charge containers in Fallujah.
Images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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and managing on-going clearance tasks and deployment of 
clearance assets in Fallujah:4,5
1. Technical. Most IEDs found in Fallujah have been victim- 
operated (high-metal content pressure plate) devices, 
only occasionally fitted with anti-lift devices.
2. Threat. The EH environment can be defined as relatively 
simple when compared to other areas of Iraq (see accom-
panying article, page 13). 
3. Coverage. The amount and extent of contamination re-
mains the biggest clearance problem.
Basis. EH clearance tasks completed by UNMAS Iraq since 
October 2016 provide a basis for the conclusions drawn re-
garding threat type, environment, and coverage. UNMAS 
Iraq operators cleared a total of 568 complete IEDs along with 
1,139 other explosive remnants of war (ERW) from a coverage 
area of 2,586,546 sq m and safely removed another 4,384 IED 
main charges and components from this same area. In addi-
tion, UNMAS Iraq rendered safe and handed over to ISF near-
ly 10,000 kg of IED explosive content for destruction.
Components. Almost without exception, the IEDs recov-
ered in Fallujah are victim-operated (VO) and crudely manu-
factured, but effective. The most common type uses a plastic 
container such as a commercial jerry can filled with 10–20 kg 
of ammonium nitrate and aluminum-based homemade ex-
plosive (HME), high-metal contract pressure plate(s), a 9-volt 
battery, detonating cord of varying length, and a commercially- 
manufactured electrical detonator. A common variant uses a 
crudely–fabricated, low-grade, steel-flattened box (colloquial-
ly known as an “explosive speed bump”) for the main charge 
filled with the same weight and types of explosive. In the ex-
plosive speed bump variant, the explosive is often wrapped in a 
plastic bag to protect against weathering.
 In most known cases, these devices are laid in large num-
bers in linear patterns of 5-to-10 m spacing, in some cases 
Image 4. A typical IED obstacle belt on the outskirts of 
Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
Image 5. A pressure plate wrapped in orange plastic dis-
covered in Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
extending 10 km, and sometimes adding multiple rows for 
density. A location in the al-Shuhada area of Fallujah (see 
Image 4) illustrates a two-row deep pattern with five plastic 
jerry can type main charges visible (shown with red circles to 
the right) representing the first row and a single main charge 
(to the left) representing part of a second row. The presence 
of buildings in the background (indicated by the black ar-
row) illustrates the proximity of EH contamination to resi-
dential areas.
Switches. Nearly all VOIEDs recovered in Fallujah are trig-
gered by pressure plates made from two flexible steel strips, 
averaging 60 cm in length, 3 cm in width, and 4 mm thick-
ness. The two strips are normally separated by a spacer such as 
a piece of wood, leaving a distance of around 1.5 cm between 
the steel strips to be closed for the switch to function. Most 
recovered pressure plates have been wrapped in black rubber 
such as an inner tube from a vehicle tire or plastic for weather- 
proofing. There is usually little attempt to camouflage the 
switches other than to bury them, normally to a depth of 5 cm 
beneath the surface. Sometimes several pressure plates will be 
discovered in close proximity wrapped in the same color plas-
tic and type suggesting a bulk manufacturing process.
Some VOIEDs feature an additional VO switch often 
called a crush wire contact or “rosary beads.” The beads 
9
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refer to tiny open switch-
es spaced at 10–30 cm in-
tervals along lacquered 
wire insulated by clear 
plastic tubing. The entire 
switch can exceed 10 m in 
length. While more prev-
alent in complex and ur-
ban environments, they 
account for roughly five 
percent of switches used 
on VOIEDS recovered from Fallujah’s contaminated areas 
to date, according to knowledgeable operators’ anecdotal re-
ports. To the untrained person, these can be difficult to locate 
visually or with a metal detector (see Image 5). 
Batteries are occasionally found as the spacer inside pres-
sure plates but more often are simply wrapped in tape for 
weatherproofing and lie close to the main charge, again sub-
surface. Voltage checks on a small number of recovered batter-
ies have revealed charges of a full 9-volts present, suggesting 
that most IEDs present are likely viable devices.
Main charges are usually buried separated from the battery 
by a distance of up to 2 m, again at a depth of around 5 cm. 
Some devices have been recovered with double pressure plates 
to a single main charge, others with double main charges from 
the same pressure plate. Whatever the variant, devices tend to 
be found in groups of identical devices and similarly spaced to 
those as already described. Operators in Fallujah have found 
and neutralized a number of VOIEDs equipped with anti-
handling devices of three types.
Type 1 is fabricated from a plastic electrical box approxi-
mately 10 cm squared and 5 cm deep with a rocker-type switch 
protruding from one face and laid subsurface typically 20 cm 
from the main charge. When set, the switch is held down by a 
brick or rock that, in most cases, is obviously and clearly out of 
place. The switch can be closed by removing the brick or rock, 
as well as stepping on the pressure plate, probably targeting a 
tendency of novice operators to clear the area around a sus-
pected IED before beginning render safe procedures (RSPs).
Type 2 uses the same pressure release mechanism but situ-
ates the switch underneath the main charge container. This 
method, recovered from several neutralized IEDs in Fallujah, 
targets an IED operator or virtually anyone else discover-
ing and lifting the main charge from the ground. While the 
switch is easily discovered by a trained IED operator, for the 
less experienced or untrained person it can exploit actions 
that might lead them to believe a device is safe when it is not—
for example, by severing the physical link to the switch.
Type 3, a rarely used variant, configures the pressure plate 
vertically. This type has been used to target mechanical assets 
and their operators, in particular bulldozers that have been 
used to breach IED belts. These pressure plates are similar to 
but much smaller than (no more than 30 cm in length) Types 
1 and 2. Type 3 variants are also buried much deeper (normal-
ly 10–15 cm). Setting them in a vertical plane and placed in 
locations where ISIS anticipated bulldozers might be used to 
move earth (for example, in tracks) allows for the targeting of 
valuable mechanical assets, initiating the IED when they are 
pushed aside with earth. While the main charges recovered 
in Fallujah are not large enough to destroy armored vehicles, 
they can cause extensive damage.
Although currently there is no accurate data on the precise 
numbers of anti-lift switches recovered, anecdotal evidence 
from interviews with international IEDD operators suggests 
that less than 10 percent of IEDs recovered to date are fitted 
with these devices.
Consistency. There is certainly sufficient evidence from an 
analysis of the 568 IEDs recovered to date from Fallujah by 
UNMAS Iraq operators to draw a number of conclusions, all 
relating to consistencies.
First, the design of pressure plates and main charges (either 
plastic or the explosive speed bump variant) is normally the 
same. This suggests that a deliberate and well-planned pro-
duction facility existed and was capable of manufacturing a 
large number of pressure plates and main charges with a rela-
tively high standard of design and reliability.
Second, the configuration of the device in the ground is nor-
mally similar enough to be predictable. In a given line of IEDs, 
it is extremely unusual to find a device where the switch, main 
charge, and power source are 
not located in the same lay-
out. This suggests that these 
IEDs are probably laid by 
relatively unskilled persons 
taught to emplace the IEDs 
through a series of steps or 
rules as a drill.
Image 6. A typical crush wire 
contact. Several dozen switch-
es like this may be present on 
lengths of lacquered wire up to 
10 m in length.7
Image courtesy of www.iedawareness.
com.
Images 7 and 8. An in-place anti-lift switch. Note the 
presence of the rock on the anti-handling switch and the 
proximity of that switch to the main charge. 
Images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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Third, the IED belts in Fallujah reveal a remarkable consis-
tency in their pattern not unlike Warsaw Pact tactics for estab-
lishing defensive minefields. Given the quantities and types of 
Soviet equipment used by Saddam’s Iraqi Army, it is reasonable 
to assume some individuals trained in conventional methods 
for laying minefields later offered their services to ISIS.
Implications. What might the community conclude from the 
data related to the work done in Fallujah concerning the types 
and locations of IEDs rendered safe? To answer this question, 
operators need to evaluate their findings relative to the envi-
ronment and RSPs. On that basis, the findings related to work 
in Fallujah show consistent and predictable patterns useful 
in planning, conducting clearance operations, and managing 
clearance assets efficiently.
Model. These consistent and predictable qualities argue for 
and help to define what the community might term a simple 
model. Several factors support this argument:
1. Location. IEDs were deployed in belts by ISIS on the pe-
riphery of Fallujah for a clear purpose, namely to stall any 
ISF assault. In these mostly rural areas, the ground could 
be dug easily and quickly for emplacement purposes.
2. Clutter. Although the defensive belts often cut through 
open ground adjacent to residential and other built-
up areas, they otherwise tend to be relatively clean, 
with little surface or subsurface metallic contamina-
tion present other than occasional items of unexplod-
ed ordnance (UXO) and associated scrap metal such as 
mortar-tail sections.
3. Dimension. Except on rare occasions—classified as the 
Type 3 IED that uses a vertical pressure plate switch and 
thereby could be viewed as a three-dimensional threat—
almost all IEDs in Fallujah are two-dimensional threats 
located either at the surface or subsurface with clear im-
plications for RSPs.
4. Degradation. IEDs are susceptible to degradation for 
reason of seasonal variations in weather, in particu-
lar the cumulative effect of repeated heavy rainfall and 
flooding. The impact of weathering is especially notice-
able on ammonium nitrate-based explosives. Numerous 
main charges recovered have shown both plastic and 
metal casings shattered by explosives expanding as they 
absorb water. Type 2 IEDs’ (explosive speed bumps) 
main charges are also susceptible to rapid oxidation of 
the casings with many severely corroded.
5. Exposure. IED pressure plates often can be found in the 
open and on the surface due to the action of rain water 
washing away less compacted earth covering them. 
6. Human. Local residents who either have witnessed, have 
roles in setting IEDs, or have knowledge of their exis-
tence have proven to be a significant source of informa-
tion concerning details on locations and emplacement 
methods, contributing to Non-technical Surveys as 
well as subsequent clearance operations.
7. Render Safe. In terms of neutralization and RSPs, 
analysis of recovered IEDs strengthens an argument 
that this is a simple environment for three reasons.
 » Easy to locate. Standard metal detection equipment 
can identify extremely strong metal signatures from 
the ubiquitous high-metal content pressure plate
 » Signature. Detector heads can localize and define 
the size of the signature, often defining the pressure 
plate before any manual intervention takes place
 » Visual. Even the crush wire contact switch has 
proved relatively easy to detect by trained personnel, 
firstly by using the naked eye and secondly by detect-
ing a strong signature via the Minelab F3 Compact 
used by the majority of UNMAS High Risk Search 
Teams in Fallujah.7
Given the relatively “clean” environment these IEDs exist 
within, as well as the identification and cancellation of spu-
rious contacts (including UXO scrap such as shrapnel), RSPs 
are normally a relatively simple and quick process.
Conclusion 
In summary, consistency and relative simplicity of de-
vice design and layout as described greatly facilitate RSPs in 
Fallujah. Where an IED operator is working within an estab-
lished IED belt, the consistency of the device’s linear pattern, 
regular spacing, and makeup is usually obvious. This then 
gives search teams, team leaders, and IED operators a degree 
of confidence in planning and conducting clearance activities.
Exceptions. Where secondary switches are incorporated into 
devices, their presence so far has been obvious. For switches 
utilizing a brick or rock to encourage pressure release, a pair 
of wires can easily be located running from the suspected 
switch location toward the main charge. For pressure re-
lease switches, the careful fingertip exploration of the area 
around the suspected main charge normally identifies wires 
running from the detonator (always found on the top of 
the main charges) to the underside of the main charge con-
tainer. Regardless of the presence of anti-handling switch-
es, RSPs remain relatively easy. IED operators identify the 
location of the IED’s component parts and then take semi- 
remote action against either the power source or the detona-
tor. A careful fingertip isolation of the switch, main charge, 
and any other suspected component easily allows them to 
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DEFINING COMPLEX 
ENVIRONMENTS
negate the presence of additional detonators or power sourc-
es prior to semi-remotely breaking the circuit. Hook-and-line 
procedures further reduce any residual risk to search teams in 
completing the neutralization of devices.
Skills. The simple environment model has implica-
tions for operations transferred to local national person-
nel when appropriately trained. Based on collected data and 
UNMAS-documented operations, and the types of devic-
es encountered, both search and RSPs can be broken down 
into simple, basic drills that can be taught, practiced, and as-
sessed for relatively inexperienced personnel. According to 
a year-long pilot study, after a six-week training course led 
by experienced international technical advisors, a cadre of 
predominantly former-ISF, IED-operator recruits deployed 
as members of two Rapid Response Teams to Fallujah where 
their work was monitored and found successful in terms of 
IEDs located and rendered safe.
Variables. An assessment of UNMAS data compiled from 
Fallujah suggests three variables define a simple environment 
model for conducting IED clearance both there and in simi-
lar environments. Moreover, it suggests a simple environment 
model could benefit from a second order analysis and evalua-
tion of data related to interaction of these three variables.
Caveat. The simple environment model, like all models, de-
pends upon assumptions and conditions continuing without 
change, which may not be the case for at least two reasons. 
First, the ISF previously conducted render-safe clearance of 
some IED belts near Fallujah according to military standards 
and under combat conditions, which necessitates an approach 
different from humanitarian standards. In many cases, these 
military RSPs require only the removal of detonators, probably 
by hand, while leaving the charge in place, which, within the 
context of humanitarian clearance standards constitutes a po-
tential threat. Second, evidence suggests that Iraq is not yet a 
fully post-conflict environment insofar as IEDs continue to be 
placed by ISIS operatives. Such old and new threats make con-
tinuing threat assessments necessary to ensure that processes 
in use are not likely to be exploited by any belligerent forces.
Applicability. EH clearance operations, particularly in 
high-threat and IED-laden contexts containing complex envi-
ronments such as in Mosul (see companion article, page 13) 
are, by definition, extremely expensive compared to relatively 
simple environments such as Fallujah. Given the number of 
IEDs, the worldwide effort to address clearance in a timely, 
cost-effective way while protecting operators has become a 
matter for further data analysis and revised models. Effective 
business plans need to start with solid, applicable field experi-
ence quantified by data and driving an operational concept. 
To date, the UNMAS Iraq experience in Fallujah says this is 
possible even in the short term and is already being tried and 
has proven to be a working concept. 
See endnotes page 60
Image 9. Four complete VOIEDs neutralized by a local na-
tional IED operator in the al Shuhada district of Fallujah 
on 24 January 2019.
Image courtesy of UNMAS. Image 10. A local national IEDD operator shows the re-
sults of his day’s work in Fallujah.
Image courtesy of UNMAS.
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More than any other post-conflict environment in Iraq, the complexity of west Mosul and its im-provised explosive device (IED) threat challenges 
our fundamental perceptions and definitions of mine ac-
tion. From here, 400 km north of Baghdad in the al-Maedan 
District on the west side of the Tigris River, ISIS ran its ca-
liphate and made its ill-fated last stand against attacking Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF). 
Context. Clearance operations began in east Mosul even 
as the battle in west Mosul drew to a close. Nearly two years 
later, the al-Maedan District in west Mosul remains in ru-
ins, heavily contaminated by explosive hazards (EH), and 
has served as a virtual laboratory for real time study of EH 
clearance in a complex, urban environment, which begs the 
question: what makes it complex?1 In a word, context. This 
influences render-safe procedures (RSPs) as determined by 
pre-event, event, and post-event phases, along with their re-
spective physical and political factors. 
Reality. Why post-event and not-post conflict? Because 
the conflict continues. Even as UNMAS Iraq operators and 
others undertake ostensibly humanitarian clearance tasks, 
they remain under ISIS threat, subject to last-minute mission 
changes based on daily intelligence reports. Sometimes clear-
ance personnel are targeted because they are perceived as part 
of an opposing, active military force by the very populations 
they serve. 
Objective. According to current U.N. intelligence esti-
mates, between 20,000 and 30,000 ISIS insurgents remain in 
Iraq.2 Their tactics may have changed, but their intent remains 
the same: regain control of territory actively through guerilla 
tactics and intimidation; and passively through their deployed 
IEDs. Until cleared, these IEDs contribute to “destabilization” 
insofar as they deny access to and repair of infrastructure and 
the rehabilitation of homes.3 
Outcome. When viewed from an outcome perspective, 
IEDs are less explosive remnants of war (ERW) and more 
“passive attack” weapons, part of a strategy that is both de-
fensive and offensive at the same time. So long as IEDs remain 
in place, and thereby stall repair of infrastructure and impor-
tant cultural assets—such as mosques and churches—they ul-
timately lead to a political outcome. Despite strong evidence 
of progress and the on-going recovery in east Mosul and 
by Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]
IEDS AND URBAN CLEARANCE 
VARIABLES IN MOSUL: 
DEFINING COMPLEX 
ENVIRONMENTS
Al-Maedan, west Mosul, May 2018.
All images courtesy of UNMAS Iraq.
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elsewhere, returnees living with threats and 1.8 million inter-
nally displaced persons (IDPs), mostly living in camps, blame 
the government for their plight. Those not already benefiting 
from progress to date are dissatisfied and vulnerable to ISIS 
propaganda.4
Factors. RSPs as a function of tactics, type, design, and lo-
cation and/or placement of IED types depend upon context. 
Therefore, to understand EH clearance in west Mosul, the 
community needs to understand the adversaries: their objec-
tives, strategy, tactics, weapons of choice, and how these were 
used over time. The al-Maedan District of west Mosul serves 
as a kind of “time capsule” wherein operators can differenti-
ate the three phases already mentioned: pre-event, event, and 
post-event. Clearance operations to date document the follow-
ing as contributing factors to complex urban environments for 
EH clearance: 
PRE-EVENT FACTORS
• Design. IEDs cleared from sites in Mosul to date can be 
characterized by range and level of technical complexity 
suggesting extremely competent and capable design and 
manufacturing facilities.5
• Detonation. ISIS manufactured timed, victim-
`operated, command-initiated devices to support con-
ventional combat tactics and to enhance combat 
effectiveness or delay/harass opposing forces.
EVENT FACTORS
• Distribution. ISIS deployed thousands of IEDs target-
ing combatants during the 2017 battle to liberate Mosul; 
these contaminate the remains of completely- or nearly-
destroyed buildings and massive amounts of debris esti-
mated at more than 7 million tons.
• Density. ISIS relied on IEDs to defend its forces as they 
withdrew to tighter defensive perimeters in west Mosul; 
mapping the geography of fighting is a strong indicator 
useful in directing post-event survey and assessment of 
EH types and amounts.
POST-EVENT FACTORS
• Dimension. More than any other factor, victim- 
operated IEDs (VOIEDs) hidden in walls, air condi-
tioning units, or under garments hanging on pegs add 
a third dimension to urban environment clearance, fur-
ther complicated by narrow streets, piles of debris, and 
the restricting maneuverability of mechanical assets.
• Biologic. Nearly two years after the battle for west 
Mosul, operators still find deceased victims wearing 
suicide belts by the hundreds, which pose both explo-
sive and biologic threats as well as the need for protec-
tion and coordination of the return of the remains. 
• Security. ISIS continues to use VOIEDs as booby-
traps to deny access to ostensibly liberated areas by in-
discriminately targeting noncombatants as part of an 
on-going guerilla campaign that includes the harass-
ment, abduction, and murder of the local population. 
Meanwhile, clearance teams remain targets for both 
IED and small arms attacks.
Lethality. If these factors can be measured as variables, 
then the UNMAS experience and data compiled from the 
west Mosul clearance operations provides a baseline for for-
mative thinking related to a proposed lethality index, first to 
measure complex environments and, second, to help opti-
mize clearance skillsets and levels appropriate for still-to-be-
defined new doctrine and standards currently lacking in the 
humanitarian mine action community. 
Progression. After liberation in October 2017, most 
UNMAS clearance teams assigned both explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) and IED experts to focus on emergency, first-
responder-type tasks. Where it was safe to do so, UNMAS 
used these emergency tasks to focus on areas of the city most 
affected by fighting to safely remove the most obvious EH 
hazards consistent with U.N. stabilization and humanitari-
an initiatives.
Volume. As of 30 January 2019, UNMAS operators had 
conducted 3,564 conventional EOD tasks and rendered safe 
a range of conventional threats, including mortars, rock-
ets, projectiles, grenades, and 21 air-dropped munitions and 
guided missiles. While small arms and pyrotechnics clearly 
do not represent the same level of hazard to local populations 
as other types of conventional ordnance, in order to eliminate 
the subsequent reuse by ISIS, they cannot be ignored. As of 30 
January 2019, UNMAS operators had removed and rendered 
safe for disposal a grand total of 651,039 threats of all types.6,7
Categories. As of 30 January 2019, UNMAS operators 
had completed 1,092 IED tasks in Mosul alone, and ren-
dered safe and removed 25,302 IEDs of all types (including 
component parts such as main charges or switches alone), 
ranging in sophistication from simple and crude devices to 
technically sophisticated and innovative based on their de-
livery method.7 While IEDs normally are classified as a func-
tion of their means of initiation (time, victim-operated, or 
command-initiated), this classification does not facilitate 
a broader analysis of IED contamination in Mosul. In sim-
ple terms, ISIS developed IEDs to reflect three categories of 
operational requirements:
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1. To support conventional combat with improvised 
substitutes for commercial military munitions and 
ordnance.
2. To enhance combat effectiveness through the inte-
gration of improvised weapons into existing force 
structures. 
3. To delay and harass advancing ISF.
Manufacture. ISIS achieved a level, scale, and quality of 
arms manufacturing—including IEDs—equivalent to con-
ventional arms manufacturers. For example, ISIS manufac-
tured 120 mm mortar bombs to tolerances that—at least at 
a superficial examination—are all but indistinguishable from 
weapons commercially-manufactured to military specifica-
tions and standards. ISIS 120 mm mortar bombs were recov-
ered containing high-explosive (HE) and chemical fills such as 
mustard gas. Many unfired bombs were recovered with quality- 
assurance labels attached illustrating what was a technically- 
advanced manufacturing and acceptance process. A total of 
343 ISIS-manufactured mortars were recovered, including the 
larger 210 mm variants, with most being rendered safe and re-
covered for subsequent disposal. 
Fuzes. ISIS also developed a range of fuzes. Like their 
mortars, these show remarkable consistency based on their 
simple but effective action mechanisms. All improvised fuzes 
recovered by UNMAS operators have 
been point detonating, manufactured 
from machined aluminum or plas-
tic, often with simple creep springs 
retaining strikers into modified 
nonelectrical detonators. Evidence 
gathered from west Mosul shows that 
several variants of ISIS fuzes have 
been used on ordnance ranging from 
mortars to air-delivered munitions 
and rockets.
Modifications. ISIS also modi-
fied other common conventional mu-
nitions, including the ubiquitous 40 
mm grenade found in several modi-
fied forms. The most common vari-
ation replaces a factory fitted fuze 
with fully improvised point detonat-
ing variants; or a second, common 
modification to the existing fuze al-
lows use of the munition as an air-
dropped grenade from drones, or 
simply thrown by hand. 
Air-dropped Munitions. The 
ISIS air-delivered aerial munition (ADIM) is yet another vari-
ant of the modified 40 mm grenade-type weapon, designed to 
be paired with the existing range of ISIS fuzes and attached to 
a plastic body. Explosive fills encountered have included HE, 
ammonium nitrate-based explosives, and modified 23 mm 
high-explosive incendiary projectiles for use as hand-thrown 
and drone-dropped weapons. 
ISIS 210 mm and 120 mm mortar bombs. Note the quality control stickers on the 
tail sections of the 120 mm mortar bombs (center left).
Typical ISIS improvised point detonating fuzes (IDPF).
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Suicide Belts. UNMAS operators recovered and ren-
dered safe 1,142 suicide belts and vests in west Mosul, many 
still strapped to the remains of ISIS fighters. These weapons 
also show remarkably consistent design, utilizing UZRGM-
type fuzes (both homemade and military) directly attached by 
detonating cord taped around HE, normally with added ball-
bearing type fragmentation. These devices are almost always 
recovered in military-style webbing belts and pouches. Clearly 
a weapon of last resort for the fighter wearing them, logically 
they would be self-initiated when either being overrun by ISF 
or while storming fortified positions.
Enhancements. UNMAS operators found and rendered 
safe numerous IEDs designed to improve the combat effec-
tiveness and firepower of ISIS fighters. Evidence to date shows 
these weapons fall into one of two categories: improvised/
modified rockets and vehicle-delivered explosives. The techni-
cal sophistication of many of these IEDs is impressive, both in 
terms of design and explosive effect. Many improvised rocket 
designs also integrated chemical weapons (normally low-grade 
mustard gas) into their warheads.
Launchers. ISIS improvised-rocket designs have been 
analyzed in detail by a number of organizations, includ-
ing UNMAS.8 In one specific clearance operation alone at 
the al-Shifa hospital complex in west Mosul, UNMAS op-
erators recovered and rendered safe nearly 100 improvised- 
rocket launchers along with a large number of used launch-
ers. UNMAS identified and assessed four launcher variants 
that probably entered service in early 2017. Two of the variants 
contain PG-7 and PG-9LR, the other two containing PG-9SR 
and a thermobaric-type projectile. In reality, the ISIS desig-
nated thermobaric warhead is simply another high-explosive 
projectile. Launchers share as common design features a hand-
grip assembly, a 9-volt direct current (DC) power source, tube 
diameter, improvised-fin assembly, and internal configura-
tions (projectile or rocket, improvised propelling charge, and 
counter-mass); however, the sighting system can vary.9 While 
the launchers are intended to be disposable, ISIS instruction 
sheets recovered by UNMAS operators tell users to retain and 
return the launchers, presumably for refill. ISIS videos cir-
culating in 2017 showed what appeared to be rockets being 
loaded into launchers under apparently sterile conditions.10 
Evaluation of these launchers, along with anecdotal evidence 
of their use in Mosul strongly suggests that these launch-
ers were developed to be integrated into infantry-type fight-
ing in urban environments such as Mosul. The ISIS-designated 
thermobaric warhead would seem to be specifically designed 
to attempt to enhance blast effects, particularly when used 
in buildings.
An ISIS-modified, 40 mm high-explosive, dual purpose grenade, probably 
intended for hand delivery.
Typical ISIS ADIMs with ISIS-variant point-detonating fuzes attached. Note 
the driving band of the 23 mm projectile visible through the body of the 
third ADIM from the left.
A typical ISIS suicide belt recovered in west Mosul. Note the dual UZRGM-
type fuzes and the added fragmentation around the pouch-sized main 
charges.
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Vehicles. UNMAS operators also recovered and ren-
dered safe several vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) from 
west Mosul; several others were located in cleared piles of 
destroyed vehicles placed in scrap heaps by ISF mechanical- 
handling equipment, e.g., diggers, earthmovers. Other con-
firmed VBIEDs still remain, as the precarious states of 
partly-destroyed buildings have prevented access for safe 
disposal. Again, the design suggests their intended purpose 
was to enhance combat operations. Variants were rendered 
safe with both manual (suicide) and remote detonation 
mechanisms and explosive effects with the aim of inf lict-
ing mass casualties (via large explosive payloads) as well as 
more targeted attacks via concealed improvised explosively-
formed penetrator (EFP) type devices. 
Switches. ISIS manufactured time-based, command- 
intiated, and victim-operated devices from its factories in 
west Mosul, and then deployed these as part of a delay-and-
harass defense strategy against any ISF assault. 
• Time-based. Although UNMAS operators have yet 
to recover a complete and intact time-based IED, based 
on timer components recovered and analyzed to date, 
ISIS likely deployed a limited number of time-based 
IEDs. Again, analysis of the time-based IED compo-
nents shows a standard ISIS manufacturing technique: 
brown-plastic boxes with hot glue-sealed lids form the 
basis of time switches; written instructions describe how 
to set time delays of up to 90 minutes. Some variants in-
clude electrical “safe-to-arm” switches as well as multi-
ple 9-volt DC batteries wired in both series and parallel, 
obviously to match the intended power requirements 
of the attached circuitry or detonators. Once again, the 
only confirmed timer components discovered and re-
covered by UNMAS operators in Iraq have been from 
west Mosul.11 
• Command-initiated devices deployed by ISIS in 
west Mosul used both wire and remote-controlled (RC) 
systems. Evidence from command-wire-type devices 
rendered safe by UNMAS operators feature relatively 
short lengths of command wire, suggesting they were 
used to carefully and accurately target passing ISF foot 
or vehicle patrols, probably with follow-up small arms 
action. This further suggests that ISIS planned and ex-
ecuted complex ambushes as ISF advanced into west 
Mosul. Main charges used in command-wire IEDs fea-
ture large EFP and “platter-type designs” to enhance ex-
plosive effect, also giving an ability to effectively attack 
armored vehicles.
• Remote-control. UNMAS analysis of three types of 
devices recovered by UNMAS operators in west Mosul:
1. Long Range Cordless Telephone (LRCT). 
Relatively few LRCT devices have been recovered, 
probably due to the fact that they quickly became 
obsolete as the growing mobile telephone network 
in Mosul City was utilized for longer range and 
more reliable communications.
2. Dual Tone Modulated Frequency (DTMF) 
devices have also been used in relatively small num-
bers based on evidence to date. These devices re-
quire entry of coded numbers into a handset and 
transmission for activation and thereby provide a 
high degree of protection against accidental initia-
tion; however, they are highly susceptible to elec-
tronic counter measures as well as environmental 
conditions such as degradation to power sources 
due to weather and time, much like LRCTs. 
3. Mobile Telephones appear to be a default choice 
for ISIS when integrating remote-control switches 
into IED designs. 
Modifications. Recovered mobile telephones (nor-
mally basic, low-cost handsets) were modified in several 
ways. Internal antennas were replaced and devices have ad-
ditional power sources and circuitry to initiate attached 
electrical detonators. 
Among the most sophisticated integration of mobile tele-
phones into IEDs is their use as arming mechanisms for pas-
sive infrared (PIR) victim-operated devices. These designs 
were recovered from a range of locations, including buildings 
Four variants of ISIS improvised rockets, all recovered by 
UNMAS in west Mosul.
A typical ISIS suicide belt recovered in west Mosul. Note the dual UZRGM-
type fuzes and the added fragmentation around the pouch-sized main 
charges.
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where they were connected to large numbers of 9-volt DC bat-
teries thus providing an extended life as an active IED. One 
IED successfully rendered safe by UNMAS contained 22 bat-
teries connected to a Nokia mobile telephone that acted as an 
arming switch for the PIR sensor. 
The dangers in rendering safe any IED containing a PIR 
switch are considerable. While many recovered devices have 
contained batteries with insufficient remaining current to ini-
tiate the attached detonator, others did not. In these cases, it is 
likely that other component failure or environmental factors 
prevented these devices from functioning.
Victim operated. A range of other victim operated de-
vices were rendered safe by UNMAS in west Mosul. In many 
cases, these are deployed to target personnel and are some-
times used to build anti-handling devices into IEDs. Tripwire-
type devices have used clear fishing twine, usually laid across 
doorways, pathways, or other obvious choke points. One 
variant encountered used medical syringes; when force is 
applied to the attached fishing twine, the switch contained 
within the syringe is closed, thus completing an electrical cir-
cuit and initiating the attached IED. Another used integrat-
ed “push-pull” toggle switches with fishing twine. As with 
the syringes, these toggle switches were recovered from trip-
wire IEDs and as bulk components. Both of these switches 
suggest a clear intent on the part of ISIS to target EOD and 
IEDD personnel in operations following the expected libera-
tion of Mosul.
What is clear from the range of IEDs and associated 
components recovered from Mosul is that ISIS effective-
ly produced and deployed a wide-ranging and technically- 
sophisticated IED threat, representing the entire spectrum 
of time, victim-operated, command-initiated, and projected-
IED capabilities. 
Three dimensions. What does this mean in terms of 
applying existing humanitarian mine action (HMA) doc-
trine to the complex EH situation in Mosul? Or, what makes 
Mosul different? 
First, the EH environment is a three-dimensional prob-
lem. EH have been located in sub-surface, surface, and 
vertical/aerial pockets (walls, ceilings, and improvised air–
dropped munitions). The prevalence of metal in the urban 
environment, in particular reinforcement bar (rebar) in 
A typical ISIS mechanical timer recovered by UNMAS in 
west Mosul.
A typical ISIS DTMF recovered by UNMAS in west Mosul.
A Nokia mobile telephone attached to a plastic con-
tainer with 22 9-volt DC batteries inside (top). Mobile 
telephones also have been used as arming switches for 
attached PIR devices (bottom).
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concrete, makes search activities that rely on metal detection 
extremely difficult. 
Second, where the environment degrades detector capa-
bilities, the combination of visual recognition and experi-
ence (i.e., knowing what to look for) become key factors. Safe 
and efficient clearance depends upon highly-trained search 
personnel being able to quickly differentiate between in-
nocuous items and those requiring further investigation. 
Effectively, experience gained from each search contributes to 
planning for the next, to include deployment of search teams 
and assets.
Third, threat assessment is usually considered to be an ac-
tive and dynamic process, but the formulation of a threat 
assessment in post-event Mosul arguably alters the normal 
relationship between the assessed intent, capability, and lo-
cation available to the individual laying the IED.12 Therefore, 
the key challenge to any IED render-safe operation is know-
ing the type of device, its method of initiation, layout, and 
fabrication. 
Reconnaissance. Within a “conventional” setting, 
threat information can normally be established via ques-
tioning of witnesses. However, in west Mosul, local people 
were often not present in their homes when IEDs were laid, 
and many devices were moved as a result of mechanical- 
handling equipment activity or simply exposed due to envi-
ronmental changes. This leads to the logical question “What 
about robots?” No current UNMAS implementing partner 
uses robots for IEDD support, partly due to the cost of even 
small robots, partly for operational difficulties in urban set-
tings, and partly due to the limited (nonexplosive) actions 
that can be safely and effectively delivered from the avail-
able platforms. 
Variables. Findings in Mosul to date suggest a threat 
environment further complicated by a combination of vari-
ables: conceptual, physical, and device-specific. These in-
f luence the threat environment but do not conform to any 
preconceived fixed relationship determined by the design 
or components of the IED alone. Even then, there seem to 
be few constants available.13 
For example, the environment variable may or may not 
cause degradation. Contrary to the argument that batteries 
degrade with time such that they no longer contain a charge 
sufficient to initiate an electrical detonator, evidence suggests 
in the short term this is not true. Recent tests on the batteries 
from a recovered RC armed PIR IED in Rawah (west Anbar) 
show that, despite the device being in place for approximate-
ly two years, each 9-volt DC battery in the device contained a 
full 9 volts of charge. Further, the battery shelf life expiry date 
was indicated as 2021. Evidence collected from other tests on 
recovered batteries provided similar data. 
Constants. Given there is no clear and proven degrada-
tion of battery life as a function of time and/or environmental 
conditions, and therefore, the lethality of the device cannot 
be assumed to be reduced over time, the technical complexity 
of an IED is always a key factor in threat assessment, as well 
as a key determiner of the subsequent RSP.
Competency. Contrary to normal RSPs that usual-
ly would rely on explosive materials, conditions in Mosul 
call for simple tools such as “j-cutters” used semi-remotely 
to neutralize IEDs as well as highly-trained IEDD operators 
with the skills and experience to recognize and render safe 
threats. For example, devices such as the improvised ISIS 120 
mm mortar bombs may contain high-explosive or chemical-
agent (mustard gas) fills. Often only subtle details differenti-
ate between threats, which may or may not be safe to move. 
Hostility. IED operators work in high-threat environ-
ments where render-safe operations expose them to retalia-
tory attacks. In addition, there is always a possibility that the 
security situation within a clearance location can deteriorate 
and the IED operator becomes a target by virtue of the fact 
that they are clearing IEDs. 
An ISIS “push-pull” toggle switch before and after remov-
al of tape.
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Characteristics. For purposes of EH clearance, west 
Mosul can be characterized as a complex environment based 
on the following factors:
1. A diverse range of complex IEDs.
2. The quantity of IED threats and other EH threats present.
3. The three-dimensional exposure.
4. Accessibility to clearance sites for threat assessment. 
5. Reliance on semi-remote means for neutralization.
6. Extreme consequences of accidental initiation.
Differentiation. The complex threat environment, as 
with all environments, should drive the selection of person-
nel, equipment, and training as well as standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and operational-review processes. 
Experience. The implications of differentiating between 
simple and complex threat environments in terms of assets to 
perform adequate, safe, and cost-effective render-safe opera-
tions, likely focus on IED operators and their experience re-
gardless of local or international status. Moreover, qualified 
personnel must be present at task locations at all times to pro-
vide oversight of threat assessment and the conduct of search 
and subsequent RSPs. The economic implications should be 
as obvious as they are inescapable: the more experienced the 
operator, the safer and quicker clearance will be, albeit more 
costly the task. While the competencies for IED operators are 
discussed and described in IMAS and U.N. standards, the re-
quirements of a complex environment suggest those selected 
both as international technical advisors as well as local nation-
al IED operators should be carefully considered, tested, and 
evaluated based on demonstrated skills in line with overarch-
ing competencies described in IMAS and U.N. standards.14,15 
Conclusions. What are the implications for future EH 
clearance activities in complex urban environments? Facts 
and analysis support the following conclusions.
1. IED clearance activities should be considered as a func-
tion of technical complexity rather than threat assess-
ment. 
2. While the perception of threat to an IED operator from 
a device may decrease over time in the post-event envi-
ronment, facts suggest devices remain lethal in the long 
term.
3. The EH context as determined by pre-event, event, and 
post-event phases and related factors establish a context 
for threat assessment and appropriate RSPs.
4. Existing HMA doctrine will need to change to reflect 
this new operating reality. UNMAS is currently linking 
the development of standard working practices—for ex-
ample, linking “residential area search and clearance” 
to both IMAS and implementing partner SOPs based 
on experience gained during operations to date in both 
simple and complex environments.
5. The concept of complex environments, compared to the 
simple environments (see previous article), becomes a 
key aspect not only for capacity development but re-
cruitment and selection of IEDD operators. Future work 
plans are now carefully tailoring implementing partner 
capabilities to match the operational environment.
6. The need for continued research and analysis of 
ongoing operations should include a lethality index 
based on the pre-event, event, and post-event phases 
and related factors identified as a gauge to assess future 
operations and task difficulty, also important as a basis 
to establish and report efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
To be continued. 
See endnotes page 60
A “j-cutter” positioned prior to semi-remotely cutting a 
single electrical wire connecting a power source to an IED.
Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D.
Explosive Hazard Management Team Leader
United Nations Mine Action Service (Iraq)
Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D., a UNMAS (Iraq) 
Explosive Hazard Management team 
Leader, has 20 years of professional expe-
rience in military and HMA. As a former 
British Army Ammunition Technical 
Officer, he worked as a High Threat IEDD 
Operator in several operational environ-
ments before transitioning to HMA. His 
HMA experience has developed through 
time spent as an IEDD operator, then a program manager, before 
transitioning to UNMAS. His academic background includes a mas-
ter’s degree in global security and a doctorate (Ph.D.) in politics and 
international studies. His thesis on arms control and intelligence has 
been published internationally as the book Before Intelligence 
Failed. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the University of Nottingham 
Centre for Conflict, Security and Terrorism where he maintains an 
active research agenda.
20
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss2/1
ISSUE 23.2 @ JULY 2019 21
T he year 2017 was the third in a row of an exception-ally high number of mine victims. According to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, in 2017 alone, 
7,239 people became casualties of landmines or explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW), of which at least 2,793 were killed.1,2 Apart 
from their direct physical effects, landmines and ERW also re-
strict access to basic resources such as food and water, limit the 
use of key infrastructure, and both force and restrict migra-
tion.2 This article focuses on the impact of landmines and ERW 
on food security, with an emphasis in food production.
Even though the relationship between landmines and food 
production may seem obvious, theoretically, there are many 
different possible mechanisms linking them, depending on 
the affected country or region. Thus, the aim of this article is 
twofold. First, it provides an overview of the possible theoreti-
cal mechanisms connecting landmines and ERW to decreased 
food security. Second, the theory is applied and assessed in the 
case of Lebanon.
The case study is presented based on specific literature on 
the Lebanese case, and on reports from the Lebanon Mine 
Action Centre (LMAC), the Landmine and Cluster Munition 
Monitor, the United Nations, and other international orga-
nizations. Whereas landmines and ERW still present a grave 
threat to civilians and pose a significant impediment for the 
development of affected communities, this article finds that 
landmines and ERW alone insufficiently explain food insecu-
rity in Lebanon.
Nexus Between Landmines and 
Food Security
Researchers, policy-makers, and practitioners have been in-
creasingly aware of the often-unremembered impacts of armed 
conflict. Previous research has focused on the environmental 
damage caused by warfare and its effects on land manage-
ment and migration.3,4 Drawing on this specific literature and 
other papers on landmines, cluster munitions, ERW, and im-
provised explosive devices (IEDs), as well as mine action re-
ports, it can be assessed that landmines impact food security 
via six different and somewhat reinforcing mechanisms: ac-
cess denial (to arable land, water sources, and infrastructure), 
loss of livestock, land degradation, reduced workforce, finan-
cial constraints, and aid dependency.
Food security is impacted by landmines via the lack of ac-
cess to arable land. Minefields are basically laid either to pro-
vide protection to military bases and strategic resources or 
as obstacles to the enemy’s freedom of movement.5 For the 
latter, it is likely that minefields will cover a large extent of 
otherwise unprotected areas, such as open fields and plains. 
Alternatively, militaries and nonstate armed groups fre-
quently lay nuisance minefields, aimed at delaying and dis-
organizing the enemy.5,6 Therefore, large areas of arable and 
pasture lands are contaminated by landmines, for example, 
in Lebanon, Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Sinai, Kuwait, 
and Iraq.7 Access denial is further extended due to the sus-
pected presence of landmines or ERW.
Landmines are also laid near water sources to reinforce 
natural obstacles, such as beaches, rivers, lakes, and irri-
gation ditches.8 Likewise, dams and hydroelectric power 
plants, often perceived as strategic targets, may be protected 
by minefields.5 The consequent lack of access to water sourc-
es further compromises food security, especially livestock, 
animal production, and herder communities. In addition, 
minefields aim to restrict access to infrastructure. Key roads, 
highways, railways, ports, and airports, as well as stations, 
bridges, and crossings are likely to be mined during con-
flicts. In this sense, landmines also limit the maintenance 
by Henrique Garbino [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ]
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and construction of new infrastructure,7,9 which indirectly 
impacts the food production chain.
Livestock is directly affected by mines, especially large 
mammals such as cattle, horses, camels, and even sheep.10–12 
Moreover, when humanitarian demining programs are ab-
sent, communities rely on rudimentary techniques to assess 
whether an area is safe or not. In many cases, this means let-
ting cattle graze in suspected hazardous areas.7,13
Landmines may cause land degradation in roughly four 
ways: through loss of biodiversity, micro-relief disruption 
(disruption of the first layer of soil), chemical contamination, 
and over-cultivation.7,9 First, fauna and flora are affected by 
the physical and chemical effects of the detonation of land-
mines and ERW. This is particularly relevant for conflicts 
fought in forests14 or on routes of migratory animals. In ad-
dition, when arable land is not accessible, communities turn 
to forests as their last resort for fuel (i.e., wood), food, and 
shelter. This effect is aggravated by the concentration of refu-
gees and internally displaced persons, who are considerably 
limited by minefields and concentrate around safe areas. It 
must be emphasized, though, that in some mined and con-
taminated areas biodiversity is actually very high due to the 
lack of human interference (e.g. the Korean peninsula’s de-
militarized zone).15 
Demining techniques may also contribute to loss of bio- 
diversity and deforestation. While removing small bushes 
and plants is a standard process in both mechanical16 and 
manual mine clearance,17 some communities and demining 
organizations set minefields on fire in order to clear the veg-
etation and facilitate future work.7
Conversely, some authors argue that vegetation loss, micro- 
relief disruption, or even burning in mine clearance opera-
tions may have a positive effect in biodiversity by creating 
different mixes of habitats across the landscape.18 Moreover, 
as it relates to food production, both manual and mechani-
cal mine clearance techniques arguably facilitate future land 
use for agricultural purposes, by clearing the field and effec-
tivelly ploughing it.
Likewise, micro-relief disruption is caused by the acci-
dental detonation of landmines and ERW, the use of fire as 
a rudimentary demining technique,7 and standard demining 
procedures. During standard manual mine clearance, demin-
ers are required to remove the first layers of soil not only for 
every landmine or ERW they find but for each metal fragment 
detected, including shrapnel and bullet casings. Moreover, if 
the condition of the mines or ERW do not allow for their re-
moval and further destruction in a specific area, those are ex-
ploded in situ and increase soil damage.18
Albeit minimally, land degradation may be caused by chem-
ical contamination. Regardless of whether their explosive con-
tents have detonated or not, landmines and ERW contaminate 
the soil and water sources with toxic substances,19 including 
heavy metals19 and depleted uranium,7 which come from either 
the ammunition casings or their explosive contents.11
It is worth noting that there is little evidence of actual chem-
ical contamination from conventional mines. There are a few 
landmines which might use liquid explosives (e.g. PFM-1) that 
have toxic effects. However, given their small size, the resul-
tant contamination is most likely negligible. The majority of 
mines are constructed from TNT- and RDX-based explosives, 
which are largely organic compounds and result in little or no 
toxic effects. 
Notably, the arable lands not contaminated by landmines 
usually suffer from over-cultivation. First, a smaller portion 
of land is pressed to produce more to compensate for the con-
taminated areas.7 Second, these areas are often occupied by 
forcibly displaced persons, who perceive the settlement as 
temporary and do not invest in sustainable land manage-
ment.20 In the long term, these practices may lead to soil ex-
haustion and decreased food production. 
Landmines also contribute to a reduced rural workforce 
by killing, maiming, or injuring thousands of civilians every 
landmines and explosive
remnants of  war
access denial
land degradation
financial constraints
reduced workforce
loss of  livestock
aid dependency
decreased food production and food insecurity
lack of  access to arable land
lack of  access to water sources
lack of  access to infrastructure
loss of  biodiversity
micro-relief  disruption
chemical contamination
over-cultivation
Figure 1. Summary of causal mechanisms (adapted from Berhe and GICHD).7,9
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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year. Mostly men and boys, who are usually the ones respon-
sible for providing for the household, fall victim to landmines 
and ERW.10
Finally, mine action entails considerable costs to the affect-
ed state, posing as a financial burden to investments in devel-
opment. The already fragile economies of affected countries 
are further weighed down by the enormous costs of mine 
clearance and victim assistance.7,9 Therefore, internation-
al support is critical for sustaining mine action programs. 
However, when badly managed, food assistance may under-
mine local production and cause aid dependency.22,23
Case Study: Lebanon
Lebanon is mostly contaminated with landmines and 
ERW from its two most recent conf licts: the Lebanese Civil 
War (1975–1990) and the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conf lict, as 
well as minor clashes with Israeli forces from the 1990s to 
the 2000s.24,25 A survey conducted in 2003 estimated that a 
total surface of 279.4 sq km was suspected to be contami-
nated with landmines from the civil war.25 The last contam-
ination occurred during the Israeli bombings from July to 
August 2006, when an additional 54.9 sq km were contam-
inated with approximately one-million cluster munitions 
that did not detonate.26,27 In northeast Lebanon, spillovers 
from the current conf lict in neighboring Syria has also led to 
new contamination of mostly IEDs, booby-traps, and unex-
ploded ordnance (UXO).28
It is estimated that landmine and ERW contamination 
in Lebanon after the 2006 invasion reached a peak of about 
334 sq km, more than 3.2 percent of the country area.26 The 
most affected areas by landmines are in Batroun, Chouf, 
Jbeil, and Jezzine, north of the Litani river, in the Bekaa 
Valley, and across Mount Lebanon, as well as the Blue Line, 
the U.N.-demarcated border with Israel.24 Cluster munition 
contamination is concentrated in southern Lebanon, south 
of the Litani river.29 A recent study commissioned by the 
United Nations Development Fund and LMAC further es-
timated the distribution of the contaminated area according 
to their use (Figure 2).30
Even though most of the affected areas are comprised of 
agricultural and grazing lands, those areas were defined by 
the Lebanon Mine Action Authority as second priority, and 
the clearance processes began only in 2009. The first-priority 
areas include access roads, infrastructure, water, electricity, 
municipalities, schools, houses, and gardens; while the third 
priority consists of uncultivated land, natural reserves, and 
wildlife territories. 
Socioeconomic development has been considerably affect-
ed, especially by ERW contamination. Almost 40 percent of 
land used for livelihood has been contaminated and, out of 
the total area contaminated with cluster munitions, 97 per-
cent is used for food production (78 percent for crop cultiva-
tion and 19 percent for livestock).29 Apart from major losses 
in the 2006 harvest season, unexploded cluster munitions 
rendered a large swath of southern Lebanon inaccessible to 
the local population.31,32 LMAC estimated that the cost of lost 
agricultural production in 2007 amounted to US$126.7 mil-
lion. Due to the mine action program, this value dropped to 
$25 million in 2011.24 Darwish et al., however, argue that esti-
mates of economic losses in southern Lebanon usually fail to 
account for indirect costs, which could amount to four times 
the initial estimates.33,34
Post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well 
as development of infrastructure, were considerably hin-
dered by landmines and ERW in southern Lebanon.35,36 
Preliminary estimates of the damaged caused by the 2006 
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Figure 2. Estimation of contaminated land distribution in square kilometers (as of 2017).30
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war accounted for more than 340 infrastructure locations 
and sections of road rendered inaccessible.37 Accordingly, 
infrastructure was prioritized by the national mine action 
strategy for land release and was completely cleared between 
2006 and 2009.24,38
There is not much research on the impacts of landmines 
and ERW on land degradation in Lebanon. In terms of biodi-
versity, however, natural reserves and wildlife territories were 
defined as third priority and have only recently been target-
ed by mine action programs.30,37 In addition, landmines are 
known to have impacted the management of cedar forests, in 
particular the Tannourine Cedar Forest Nature Reserve.39
Mine clearance also contributes to the loss of biodiver-
sity and micro-relief disruption in Lebanon. Mined areas are 
burned prior to demining in order to remove vegetation and fa-
cilitate mine clearance operations. This practice has been em-
ployed since at least the 1990s40 and has become a standardized 
practice, as provided for in the National Mine Action Standards 
(NMAS).42 In accordance with regular manual demining tech-
niques, ground vegetation is removed during mine clearance 
operations. However, the NMAS do not specify the maximum 
branch diameter to be cut and removed,40 leaving it to the dis-
cretion of demining organizations. Moreover, the default dis-
posal procedure for landmines and ERW is destruction in situ. 
This means that wherever found, landmines and ERW shall be 
destroyed, except if it proves to be impractical or poses consid-
erable risk to nearby structures.40
Literature is mostly absent in addressing soil and wa-
ter contamination due to landmines and ERW in Lebanon. 
Nonetheless, there is strong evidence of depleted uranium 
contamination from Israeli bombings in 2006.42 This con-
tamination is likely to come from bunker busting bombs 
and missiles, which are less likely to fail and become ERW. 
Moreover, other general studies on soil contamination in 
500,000
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
Donkeys Cattle Goats Horses Mules Pigs Sheep
Lebanese Civil War
(1975–1990)
2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict
(July–August 2006)
Figure 3. Number of livestock in Lebanon 1961–2016).
Syrian Civil War
(2011–present)2006 Israel-Hezbollah Conflict
(July–August 2006)
200
150
100
50
0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total killed Total injured
Figure 4. Total landmine and ERW casualties (2000–2016).
24
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol23/iss2/1
ISSUE 23.2 @ JULY 2019 25
Lebanon do not consider landmines and ERW but focus on 
other sources of pollution.43
Loss of livestock is not accounted for in national or inter-
national mine action reports,44,45 as it does not seem to pres-
ent a grave problem in Lebanon. Accordingly, data from the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)46 suggests that 
livestock production is more conditioned to the conf lict it-
self and area access than the physical effects of landmines 
and ERW (Figure 3). 
As of the end of 2016, at least 3,736 people were involved in 
accidents with landmines or ERW, of which 906 were killed 
and 2,830 injured.47 Even though the data available on casual-
ties is highly inconsistent, most sources indicate that victims 
are largely men and boys—accounting for roughly 90 percent 
of all casualties—from rural communities.48 After the Israeli 
invasion in 2006, casualties were concentrated in southern 
Lebanon; however, due to the influx of Syrian refugees since 
2011, victims are now concentrated in the northern and east-
ern regions.47 Accordingly, data made available in reports 
from the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor and LMAC 
25,43,46,49-61  show a sharp increase in casualties after 2006 and 
a smaller increase after 2011 (Figure 4). The graph also sug-
gests the beneficial outcomes of mine clearance and mine risk 
education (MRE), since casualties tend to decrease in time. 
By design, most mine-related incidents do not cause death. 
Likewise, the desired effect of cluster munitions is achieved 
by their detonation in large quantities; individually, one mu-
nition is usually not sufficient to kill a person. Accordingly, 
Youssef and Jawad Fares have found that most casualties in 
Lebanon suffered amputations and injuries in craniofacial re-
gions, thorax, abdomen, and lower and upper extremities.62 
Those injuries led to loss of motor function, body disfigura-
tion, chronic pain, and post-traumatic stress disorder.60
The Government of Lebanon, as indicated in Figures 5, 6, 
and 7,44,63 has invested $7.88 million per year on average in 
mine action for the last ten years, or roughly 13 percent of to-
tal government expenditure (Figure 5). In comparison to in-
ternational mine action funding, even though more modest 
on average, national investments are more stable (Figure 6). 
Moreover, the national share of mine action funding has con-
siderably increased since 2008 (Figure 7).
Even though Lebanon is a considerably well-structured 
and functioning state, information on landmines and ERW 
is often inconsistent, missing key observations, and scattered 
across various sources, perhaps due to the recent establish-
ment of the national authority and coordination center.64 
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Discussion
As previously discussed, Lebanon has been significantly 
affected by the scourge of landmines and ERW. Contaminated 
areas have denied access to large swaths of arable land, espe-
cially in southern Lebanon, and, to a lesser extent, to water 
sources and infrastructure. According to LMAC, all water 
sources and infrastructure are deemed to be clear from mines 
and ERW. Indirect losses in productivity due to lack of access 
to arable land and pasture may amount to about $30–$60 
million, during an estimated ten-year period for clearing the 
affected areas.33
Victims of landmine and ERW accidents undoubtedly suf-
fer tremendous personal challenges. However, the total num-
ber of casualties is likely too small to impact food production 
and food security outside the victim’s closest circles. It is 
worth noting that the number of casualties has considerably 
dropped in recent years, probably due to the ongoing MRE 
and mine clearance activities.44 That said, food security is per-
haps more affected by the displacement of rural workers to-
ward urban environments as a consequence of lack of access 
to arable land and fear of the threat of landmines than by the 
direct effect of landmines in killing or maiming civilians.
The recent influx of Syrian refugees coupled with the ex-
isting mine and ERW threat pose yet another risk to food 
security in Lebanon. Refugees are concentrated in most-
ly mine- and ERW-free areas in the Bekaa Valley,29 which is 
also the region with the most productive agriculture and live-
stock in Lebanon. In 2015, an estimated 3.3 million people, 
including Syrian and Palestinian refugees and host commu-
nities, were in need in the country; of which 1.35 million were 
in need of food.65 Food aid is mainly provided by the World 
Food Programme and its partners, mostly through e-cards, 
cash, and food vouchers.65 These measures help foster local 
economy and build local capacities, avoiding aid dependency. 
However, as proposed by Berhe7 and in reference to Hardin’s 
tragedy of commons,21 it is likely that the concentration of 
refugees in small areas will lead to over-cultivation and soil 
exhaustion in the long run unless accompanied by efficient 
water and land management.
Despite considerable international financial support, the 
Government of Lebanon bears significant costs for its mine 
action program. In the last years, almost .15 percent of gov-
ernment expenditure have been dedicated to mine and ERW 
clearance, MRE, victim assistance, and other support and 
administrative costs. Nearly all the investment goes to mine 
clearance, which is the most expensive component of mine ac-
tion. In 2016, for example, about 93 percent of total invest-
ments was dedicated to the clearance of landmines and ERW.44 
The financial burden born by the Government of Lebanon is 
an impediment for investment in other areas, such as infra-
structure, agriculture, and water and land management. On 
the other hand, the Lebanese mine action program is consis-
tently becoming less reliant on international support, thus de-
creasing its risk of aid dependency.
Conclusion
Access denial, especially to arable land and pasture, and the 
financial burden born by the government seem to be the most 
pressing challenges to food production in Lebanon. Lack of 
access is not only the main cause of insufficient agricultur-
al productivity, but it is also responsible for channeling the 
movement of Syrian refugees and restricting settlements. 
Even though there is not enough information on land degra-
dation in relation to landmine and ERW contamination, it is 
best contained with effective water and soil management tech-
niques and programs. The economic costs posed by the mine 
action program, however, consist of a significant share of gov-
ernment expenditure and arguably presents an impediment to 
investments in other areas.
However tragic, the reduction of rural workforce due to 
mine- and ERW-related incidents does not seem to be suffi-
cient to impact large-scale food production and food security. 
Mine victims and their families certainly face huge challenges 
to rehabilitation and personal development, but this impact is 
likely to be restricted. Likewise, the loss of livestock does not 
appear to be a significant concern.
Finally, there may be significant information gaps and mea-
surement errors in the data on mine action in Lebanon. On 
top of that, the psychological impact and trauma caused by 
death and injury of loved ones, being unable to provide for 
your family, the loss of livelihood activities, and the constant 
fear of landmines, are harder to measure.34 However, they cer-
tainly have profound effects on the economic, social, and psy-
chological well-being of local communities. 
See endnotes page 61
Henrique Siniciato Terra Garbino
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action
Uppsala University, Department of Peace and Conflict Research
Henrique Garbino served in the Brazilian 
Army from 2006 to 2017 as a combat engi-
neer officer and an EOD specialist. He has 
recently finished the master’s program at 
Uppsala University Department of Peace 
and Conflict Research and, as part of the 
Rotary Peace Fellowship, he was posted for 
three months to FSD programs in Tajikistan 
and Ukraine.
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MAG (Mines Advisory Group) has worked in Iraq since 1992 to make land safe for populations affected by decades of conflict. Landmines, cluster munitions, other unexploded bombs, as 
well as new contamination from the recent conflict with ISIS, have left a deadly legacy that prevents com-
munities from using their land, and displaced populations from returning home safely.
This historic contamination has been compounded by new contamination from the recent conflict with ISIS 
since 2014. Over 3.4 million people were displaced at the height of the crisis and the fighting has seen large 
areas of Iraq contaminated with landmines of an improvised nature, manufactured on an industrial scale, 
and deployed in urban, village, and rural settings.
The situation has led to numerous accidents among returning populations and continues to prevent many 
others from returning to their homes, placing a strain on resources in other areas of the country.1
Landmines and Unexploded 
Bombs Destroyed
Land Released by Deminers, 
Dogs, and Machines Direct Beneficiaries Risk Education Sessions
9,648 6,334,116 sqm 397,134 18,219
Results of MAG’s work in Iraq in 2018.
All graphics and images courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
Iraq A photo essay by Sean Sutton [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]
Fifty-nine year-old Hamas Said Abdulkhader, who has served 
as the village leader of Wlyawa for many decades, remembered 
what it was like back in 1983: “When helicopters flew overhead 
and bombed the area, we fled. It was like doomsday.”
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village to get some things from his house. He was killed 
by a mine. That’s how we found out there was a problem.”
In December 1991, a man from the village lost a leg to 
a mine. Tragically, just ten days later, Hamas’ brother was 
killed. “HE WENT UP A HILL TO SEE WHAT WAS LEFT OF 
THE ORCHARD AND ON HIS WAY BACK HE STEPPED ON A 
MINE.”
Between 1993 and 1994, there were two more accidents 
where villagers lost a leg. A year later, two children—
seven-year-old Ako and nine-year-old Awat—came upon 
a mine and were both killed. Each year, the village lost 
about 50 animals: dogs, sheep, cows, and goats.
“There were mines to the north, east, south, and west 
of us, only 20 meters away from where we lived,” Hamas 
continued. “Seven families stayed, the other thirteen left.” 
MAG began clearance in Wlyawa in 1996. One team worked 
in the village for two years and cleared prioritized land 
close to the houses, on both sides of the road, and one 
of the minefields going up the hill. More than 200 land-
mines were removed from the village. Due to the scale of 
contamination in the area and the limited availability of 
resources, the team then moved on to work in other vil-
lages. In 2016, MAG returned to the village and contin-
ued to carry out clearance of the remaining mine- fields 
around the village. In the past year alone (October 2017–
September 2018), 59,354 m2 of land was released and re-
turned to the community. During the clearance activities, 
Hamas Said Abdulkhader talks with a deminer from MAG.
Wlyawa Village
Wlyawa is a small village in the Sharbazher district 
of Sulaymaniyah Governorate. Currently, seven families, 
consisting of around 50 individuals, live in the village. 
However, before the Iran–Iraq war, around 250 people 
from 25 different families called this village home. The vil-
lage used to be productive and thriving until people were 
forced to flee the area in 1983. The Iraqi army had set 
up military positions for their fight against Iranian troops 
who were based in the next village, situated only 15 kilo-
meters away.
Fifty-nine year-old Hamas Said Abdulkhader, who has 
served as the village leader of Wlyawa for many decades, 
remembered what it was like back in 1983: “When heli-
copters flew overhead and bombed the area we fled, it was 
like doomsday.” At that time, the Iraqi army controlled the 
main towns and roads, but most villages were controlled 
by the Kurdish Peshmerga, and some areas were con-
trolled by Iran. “We fled from village to village, eight times 
in total. Eight times my house was destroyed. Thinking 
about that time still brings tears to my eyes. My ancestral 
homeland, where my grandfather came from, was gone, 
destroyed. I’m still so sad about it.”
After the Kurdish uprising of 1991, the Iraqi army left 
the area. Subsequently, 20 families returned and tried to 
rebuild the village, however, the presence of landmines 
made this impossible. Hamas said, “The first accident was 
in 1983, when, after we had fled, one man went back to the 
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a total of 354 dangerous items were found 
and safely removed from the land, includ-
ing 229 anti-personal mines and 125 items 
of unexploded ordnance (grenades, mor-
tars, rockets, and projectiles).
The Sharbazher district is known for ag-
riculture, especially its vineyards. Before 
the war, Wlyawa produced tobacco, dried 
grapes, pears, peaches, plums, and figs. 
One specialty of the village was growing 
acorns, which can be crushed and used to 
feed animals. The village sold more than 
200 tons of acorns every year. Even today, 
agriculture is the main source of livelihood 
for the remaining villagers in Wlyawa. 
They produce raisins, jam, and candy with 
grape paste and almonds or walnuts.
The villagers also grow a fruit called 
medlar, and sumac, a flavoring spice that 
is widely used in the Middle East. There 
are gumtrees in the area, from which the 
gum is sold for medicinal purposes and for 
producing chewing gum. MAG’s clearance 
teams are currently working on Wlyawa’s 
agricultural land. 
Hamas explained the significance of this 
land for his village: “The land that is not 
being cleared by MAG includes the best or-
chard and the best vineyard in the area. It 
also has a spring that is very important for 
the village. The area is about five hectares 
and is perfect for agriculture. We can use 
a tractor on the land, and the ground is 
very fertile. The people who moved to the 
city because of all the mines have grown 
tired there. The economy is very bad, they 
want to come back home. In the past, we 
used to export products to southern Iraq 
and Iran. Now, we have to import goods 
to survive.
The mines are further from the village, 
so thankfully the danger is less than it was 
before. But still the community is denied 
access to some of their most fertile land. 
Yet, our future looks brighter because of 
MAG’s work. When we gain access to all 
our land again, I expect many people to re-
turn. This land is rich.”
In March this year, MAG deminers found 
a watch in a minefield, at a spot close to 
where a mine had detonated. The super-
visor working at the site knew Hamas and 
that his brother had been killed in the 
area, so called him. I asked him if it was 
a rectangular Orient watch, and he said 
A total of 28 mortars and projectiles were 
found, removed, and later destroyed in a 
controlled demolition.
An EOD team deals with a cache of pro-
jectiles reported to MAG by a farmer. 
A few of the items could be seen on the 
surface and when the team investigated 
they discovered many more underneath.
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that it was,” Hamas said. “I felt my brother’s spirit. I was 
both sad and happy at the same time. I lost my brother, 
but now I have gained many new brothers, the MAG staff. 
That’s how I feel. Yes, I lost one brother but have gained 
many more. This watch, I had bought this watch in 1988. 
My brother said it was a beautiful watch, and so I took it 
off and gave it to him. THE WATCH STOPPED AT TWENTY 
MINUTES PAST TWO IN THE AFTERNOON, WHICH WAS THE 
MOMENT MY BROTHER WAS KILLED.” Hamas paused for a 
moment before continuing, “The village will return to the 
way it used to be. We can rebuild it. We just need the land 
to be safe. Saddam’s army is still here. They are a strong 
army, they don’t run away from the snow, and no one can 
see them, but they are still here. But MAG will save us. Life 
is hard in Sulaymaniyah city for our people who have not 
yet returned. Many don’t have jobs, and this is their home, 
this is their land. But they need safety.” 
MAG has deployed several teams in and around Wlyawa 
village. There are many minefields that remain, and sev-
eral decades after these mines were laid, they continue to 
have a devastating effect on the population of the village. 
Hamas’ story and what Wlyawa has experienced is all too 
common among villages in the area, highlighting the on-
going need for clearance of remaining legacy minefields. 
When cleared, the people from Wlyawa and other villages 
can finally leave the war behind them and rebuild their 
communities fully, free from fear and danger.
Namiq Aziz has six children and two wives. He and his family live in the middle of a minefield. They are the only fam-
ily living here but many others would like to return to their village and their ancestral land. The location of the village 
is stunningly beautiful in the middle of rolling hills. The fertile area is famous for many kinds of crops. 
There are landmines all around their farm and the cost has been high. Namiq’s mother lost a leg to a mine that had 
rolled down the hill and landed near the front door. His cousin Karsan lost his eyes and his arms in a landmine explo-
sion and Karsan’s son Jamal was killed just behind their house.
Hamas Said Abdulkhader 
with his brother’s watch.
Meshulan Village
This area is heavily mined, 
denying fertile land to 
many communities.
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“Then my cousin, Jamal’s 
son Karzan … set off a 
mine and was blinded. 
He also lost an arm. This 
was in 2000.”
“The first accident was with 
my cousin called Jamal. He 
died 100 meters away from 
our house in 1992.”
“Then in 1994 my mother 
stood on a mine by the front 
door and her leg was blown 
off. The mine had rolled down 
the hill.”
Namiq was also injured—he cleared dozens of 
VS50 landmines to make a safe path through 
one of the minefields so that his sheep could 
reach a good pasture. 
Some detonators from the mines he 
had in a bag exploded and he lost 
some of his fingers.
“There were 15 families living here before. They were good times and we lived well. There is good pasture
land for livestock and also perfect land for agriculture. We grew tomatoes, tobacco, watermelons, and lots
more and sold a lot of produce. The village was famous for good eggs and people used to come from other
villages to get eggs. Turkeys have also been very special here—every house had many of them. We feed
them a special diet. Honey, the honey is very special—we used to sell a lot. IT WAS GOOD UNTIL THE WAR STARTED ...”
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A MAG demining supervisor with 
a disarmed Valmara-69 bound-
ing fragmentation mine. Namiq 
had reported the mine to the 
MAG team that had rolled 
out of the minefield close 
to his house. 
The mine was in good condition in-
side with the seals completely intact 
despite many winters and fires since 
it was planted in 1983.
The Iranians attacked the area and there 
were a lot of air strikes. We fled on our 
feet with nothing—we left everything be-
hind. There was 150 of us with babies and 
elderly people and we went to a camp near 
Kanraw. We stayed there for a year and 
then went to Suaymaniya where I worked 
as a laborer. It was hard, we faced difficult 
times. We couldn’t come back home until 
1992 because fighting continued. After the 
war with Iran there was war between [the] 
Iraqi army and the Peshmerga.
I was amazed at what I saw when I came 
back. There was a burnt truck and many 
bodies. Everything was burnt and de-
stroyed—even the land and the trees were 
burnt. There was barbed wire all around 
and lots of ammunition on the ground. We 
knew there might be landmines. Wherever 
military had been there might be land-
mines.
I was so happy to go home but so sad 
to see it all destroyed. About 15 families 
came back but few stayed. As soon as they 
saw the village they turned around. It was 
mined. Now we know where the mines are 
and we do our best to avoid them but every 
year we still lose many sheep and goats 
and I am always worried about the chil-
dren. Now there are more than 30 families 
that would like to come home. We need to 
clear the mines, then our village will come 
back to life.”
-Namiq Aziz
Five-year-old Sidra helps look 
after the goats. She stays 
with relatives in Sulimaniyah 
during the week when she 
goes to school but the rest 
of the time she is at home 
surrounded by minefields.
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“I started working for MAG as a deminer 10 years ago. In the first two years, I found more than 100 landmines. Then I was 
given the chance to become a dog handler and I realized this was a great opportunity. Some people think dogs are dirty animals 
but I love my dog. My first dog was called Harri but he got old and was retired. He is very happy now and lives with a family. 
Quewe doesn’t really like people, except for me. We understand each other very well. She is getting older and will retire next 
year. I will bring her home to stay with my family. I have three children and she will have to get used to them. I will teach her 
and it will be fine.” 
-Goran Salaadin
Goran Salaadin, 28 
Dog Handler
demanding and works hard but needs to rest well when she is tired. She 
doesn’t really like people, except for me. We understand each other very 
well. She tries to bite people when tired and she easily gets jealous.”
“Quewe and I have 
been together for 
four years. She is
“Dogs are especially effective with Type 72 minimum 
metal mines as detectors are difficult to use—also 
areas with a lot of metal and a lot of scrap. I have 
seen areas that would take deminers 70 days to 
clear with a MAT cleared by dogs in just three days.”
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“I joined the Peshmerga when I was 15. There was a 
lot of fighting and I fought in many places. I was injured 
twice, once shot in the stomach and once burnt by chemi-
cal weapons. A plane dropped them and I was blinded. 
Many people died. That was in 1987.
The village was on the other side of the hill before
but that area is completely mined and we can’t go there. 
The first landmine accident was in 1996 when my cous-
ins Bakr and Sadiq were injured clearing mines. Bakr 
lost his leg and Sadiq lost his hands and an eye. Also, 
that year five of my children had an accident. They found 
a mine and did something to it and Saman, 6, Rezgar, 
10, and Chro who was 5 died and two survived. The 
next one was my uncle, Amad Rahman—he was killed. 
His son was also killed here just few weeks ago when 
he set off a Valmara. 
THEN I LOST TWO CHILDREN SARWAR, 9, AND 
SURUCH, 4, WHO WERE LOOKING AFTER SHEEP. 
My older brother Mahmud was shepherding a few years 
later. He sat down to rest. After a while he moved and 
somehow set off a mine. He was also killed. All of them 
were killed by Valmaras.
I was forced to do demining myself, I had no choice. 
I was going to lose all of my family. I was never scared 
of  demining—I just had to do it. In one hill I cleared and 
disarmed tree sacks full; about 300 kilos! 
You can see where Valmaras are usually but the 
small ones (VS50s) are often under the ground about 
30 cm apart. The Valmaras were usually 1.5 meters 
apart. I would find a row and follow them using a 
hoe to scrape the ground. My cousins died doing this 
but they didn’t know what they were doing and they 
shouldn’t have done that. So, they died. 
My family have been living in a lot of fear—not a little, 
a lot. Too much. 
Most of the land here is dangerous. Most of my family 
don’t live here anymore. They can’t. If the land was safe 
they would be back immediately.
They are safe where they are—but they are miserable. 
They do bad jobs and live a hard life. Here they could 
build a house and have cows and sheep. This is our land 
and they would be happy if they could be here.
We used to grow thyme, tobacco, barley, rice, wheat 
,and there were orchards and vineyards. There are lots 
of trees here—almonds, hawthorn, and more. The people 
are poor. They have lost their arms and their legs. WE 
NEED TO BE FREE FROM THESE LANDMINES. We are not 
free—we cannot go anywhere. We live in fear, we have 
no safety.” 
Karim Mohammad , 
Zewe Village
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“My family have been living 
in a lot of fear—not a little, 
a lot. Too much.”
Karim walks past unexploded 
ordnance next to the spot where 
three of his children were killed. 
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“Wlaghlu village is the biggest village in Sharbazar 
and has suffered more than any from landmines. In 
the 1970s there were about 150 families living there. 
It was a major center of trade between Iraq and Iran 
and had a big market—it has always been very stra-
tegic. The area is very mountainous and was the 
center of the uprising because it was hard for the 
Iraqi army to get up here. This was the base of the 
revolution. Because of this the area was very affect-
ed by the war. A lot of landmines, bombs, and chem-
ical weapons were used here.
There was also a lot of fighting between Iran and 
Iraq. This was a main frontline area for a long time 
from 1980 to 1988. In the Iran and Iraq war, most 
of the bombs landed here. So this was the center of 
the two wars from 1976 to 1988. 1988 was the be-
ginning of Anfal. The area was evacuated. Saddam’s 
army moved all the people to collective towns. One-
thousand five-hundred were killed or never seen 
again in just one night.
After the no-fly zone and establishment of the 
green line people started to come home in 1992. 
NGOs helped a lot with water, shelter, and food but 
there were problems. AS SOON AS PEOPLE STARTED 
TO REBUILD THEIR HOUSES THEY STARTED DYING. 
Many were killed by UXO. When they tried to farm, 
they died. Every day about 10 or 12 people died in 
the area. People brought their livestock and they 
died too. Many animals were lost.
Eighteen villages in subdistricts and about 40 per-
cent of the land is mined. There are two villages 
where no one has returned because of landmines, 
but people are starting to go back now. Qulajakh 
village on the other hand is still completely aban-
doned, destroyed and full of mines.
THE PEOPLE IN THIS DISTRICT ARE LIVING IN A 
CAGE. A cage made of landmines. Saddam system-
atically destroyed and mined the villages. The hills 
and countryside were already mined.
Now most of the people originally from here are 
having a difficult life. They know now where the 
landmines are—but the animals don’t. The animals 
go into the minefield and the children go to get 
them out and then they die. This is a hard life.
In the last 10 years a lot has changed here. Many 
people have built houses next to the minefields. 
There isn’t anywhere else for them [to go.] We need 
the donors to support the mine clearance here. We 
have fertile land and all we want is to return to how 
life was here in the 70s. We need our land. The area 
is very famous—it was the bread basket for the re-
gion. Clearance of the minefields will have far- 
reaching benefits for the population near and far. An 
American company wanted to build a dairy factory 
because this is a perfect area for cows. We have al-
ways had cows here. But they couldn’t do it because 
we don’t have enough land to have more cows. We 
produce enough goods in the area to just feed our-
selves. But we should be trading. If we could trade 
we can develop and we can prosper.” 
See endnote page 62
Sean Sutton
International Communications Manager
MAG, Mines Advisory Group
Instagram @seansuttonphoto
Sean Sutton is an award-winning photo-
journalist; his well-known pictures show 
the impact of landmines and explosive 
remnants of war on communities and 
have been published and exhibited all over 
the world. His book documenting how un-
exploded ordnance affect people in Laos 
was runner-up for the Leica European 
Publisher’s Award. Sutton is MAG’s inter-
national communications manager and has worked for the organi-
zation since 1997.
Wlaghlu Village
Twenty-five people 
were killed trying to 
demine their own land. 
I was hit as well in an 
explosion. I was clear-
ing the land with my 
neighbor. He 
found an RPG 
and threw it 
to one side and it 
exploded. We were 
both injured.
Village leader 
Marif Hussein 
Mohamed and 
Mohammed 
Osman 
Ahmed 
chat near 
a wall. 
Shells have been used as building 
material and a number of them still 
have a live detonator attached.
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Village leader 
Marif Hussein 
Mohamed and 
Mohammed 
Osman 
Ahmed 
chat near 
a wall. 
Shells have been used as building 
material and a number of them still 
have a live detonator attached.
Aging, unstable, and excess conventional ammuni-tion stockpiles pose the dual risk of accidental explo-sions at munition sites and diversion to illicit markets, 
thereby constituting a significant danger to public safety and 
security. More than half of the world’s countries have expe-
rienced an ammunition storage area explosion over the past 
decades, resulting in severe humanitarian and socioeconomic 
consequences.1 Thousands of people have been killed, injured, 
and displaced, and the livelihoods of entire communities have 
been disrupted. The humanitarian impact of unintended ex-
plosions is amplified when they occur in urban areas, as il-
lustrated by ammunition depot explosions in a crowded area 
in Brazzaville in 2011, resulting in approximately 500 killed, 
2,500 injured, and 121,000 made homeless.2
Improper ammunition management is also at the root of 
the diversion of arms and ammunition to illicit markets and 
onward proliferation, thus fueling armed conflict, terrorism, 
and crime.3 Diverted conventional ammunition allows non- 
State actors, such as rebels, gangs, criminal organizations, 
and terrorist groups to enhance their military capabilities. Its 
explosive nature makes ammunition particularly attractive 
for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
Essential for adequate stockpile management is the iden-
tification and disposal of obsolete, surplus, and unsafe 
AMMUNITION STOCKPILE 
MANAGEMENT: 
by Nora Allgaier [ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs ] and 
Samuel Paunila [ Ammunition Management Advisory Team ]
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 
REQUIRING GLOBAL RESPONSES 
U.N. SaferGuard regional technical workshop on ammunition management in Lima, Peru, July 2018. 
Image courtesy of UNLIREC.
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ammunition. Often, the entirety of the national ammunition 
stockpile is seen as strategically and operationally valuable, 
resulting in the accumulation of surpluses and unsafe ammu-
nition that pose a significant and completely avoidable risk.4
In many developing and conflict-affected countries, de-
fective stockpile management has been assessed as the norm 
rather than the exception, notably due to the lack of resources, 
infrastructure, and trained personnel. In these circumstanc-
es, addressing the matter of surpluses also requires a focus on 
the lack of appropriate laws, policies, and procedures as well 
as the lack of political awareness. In the absence of such a ho-
listic approach to ammunition management, governments of-
ten remain unaware of surplus stocks, and national stockpiles 
continue to be a risk to public safety and a source for crime 
and armed violence.4
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS IN
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
In recognition of the threats of accidental explosions and 
diversion, international efforts to promote the safe and secure 
management of ammunition have increased in recent years, 
as has the demand for relevant technical sup-
port. At the request of the General Assembly 
(A/RES/63/61), the United Nations developed 
the International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines (IATG) in 2011 to ensure a consis-
tent delivery of high-quality advice and sup-
port in ammunition management. The UN 
SaferGuard Programme was simultaneously 
established as the corresponding knowledge 
management platform to oversee and dis-
seminate the IATG.5
The United Nations also promotes safe 
and secure ammunition management in 
the broader context of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, in particular Goal 
16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions 
and its target related to a significant reduction 
in illicit arms flows. Moreover, securing exces-
sive and poorly-managed ammunition stock-
piles constitutes a key component in realizing 
the “Disarmament that Saves Lives” pillar of 
the Secretary-General’s agenda for disarma-
ment, “Securing Our Common Future.”6 The 
Secretary-General calls for more effective 
State and regional action on excessive and 
poorly-maintained stockpiles to prevent se-
rious humanitarian hazards that jeopardize 
the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals 
(Action 22).
VALUE OF THE IATG
Effective application of the IATG mitigates the dangers of 
unwanted explosions and frequent diversion. With the IATG, 
States have at their disposal practical, neutral, and author-
itative guidance for ammunition stockpile management. 
This guidance offers common language and a coherent ref-
erence point in the form of globally accepted good practices. 
Compiled in 12 thematic volumes and 45 modules, the IATG 
represent a comprehensive and gradual approach to life-cycle 
management of ammunition.
Importantly, the IATG take into account diversity in 
States’ capacities. They do so by equating activities necessary 
for safe, efficient, and effective stockpile management to one 
of three risk-reduction process levels (RRPLs). States can uti-
lize the RRPL system in addressing the safety and security of 
their ammunition in a gradual, incremental fashion: the de-
gree of complexity of each task and the resources required for 
its implementation determines to which RRPL it is assigned. 
Analysis of environment Capabilities assessment
Formalizing national authority
Baseline risk assessments
Risk acceptance Safeguarding law
Understanding challenges Commitment to safeammunition management Demonstration of commitment
International norms Regional obligations Existing nationalnorms IATG
Decision on national 
standards
Prioritisation of activities Drafting national standards SMART objectives
Real estate Equipment Funds Time People
Understand the problem
Initiate legislation
Map the options and choose the most appropriate
Establish strategy and priorities
Assign goals and milestones
Allocate resources to achieve goals
Implement, review and amend
Figure 1: Outline process for developing national standards for am-
munition management.
Figure courtesy of UN SaferGuard.
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Maintaining stockpile management processes at the basic lev-
el (RRPL 1) already significantly reduces the brazen risks as-
sociated to ammunition.
Using the RRPL framework as a baseline in determining 
the condition of their ammunition stocks, States can also 
identify key safety and security issues, such as prioritizing na-
tional standards development and implementation in order to 
optimize the use of resources and capabilities.7
Applying the IATG at the national level is not merely a tech-
nical undertaking. Insufficient risk awareness; absence of in-
stitutional, legislative, and operational frameworks; and lack 
of staff capacity and skills are recognized as common charac-
teristics of inadequate management of State-owned ammuni-
tion stockpiles.7 The sustainable application of the IATG thus 
requires a holistic approach including the establishment of a 
normative framework, organizational structure, equipment 
and infrastructure, personnel management, institutionalized 
training, and requisite financial resources.
APPLICATION OF THE IATG
The IATG are not meant to be a blueprint that can be rep-
licated at the national level, regardless of the circumstances. 
Instead, they provide the underpinning principles and guid-
ance on which national standards, processes, and technical 
operating procedures should be developed.7 Based on guid-
ance in the IATG, States should establish an appropriate leg-
islative framework, formalize a respective national authority, 
and approve tolerable risk levels. States may also adopt rele-
vant IATG modules as the basis for national standards.7
A critical component of a holistic ammunition management 
approach is the development of a national strategy or action 
plan with realistic goals and milestones. Recognizing and tak-
ing ownership of ammunition safety and security challenges 
at the State level is paramount to achieving a 
shared national vision on long-term objectives. 
This strategy enables States to prioritize activi-
ties and assigns roles and responsibilities more 
effectively. By defining clear goals and mile-
stones, States can demonstrate their under-
standing of the challenge, ability to plan in the 
long-term, and that response options were ade-
quately considered. This public commitment to 
addressing the challenges pertaining to ammu-
nition stockpiles can give the international com-
munity confidence to provide required resources 
and technical support.7
To facilitate IATG dissemination, the UN 
SaferGuard Programme developed a series of 
resources to support national authorities, regional organi-
zations, and partners on the ground in their efforts toward 
safe, secure, and efficient ammunition stockpile manage-
ment. The IATG implementation support toolkit provides 
web-based applications for use by ammunition experts in 
their daily work.5 These resources are also useful in commu-
nicating risks to leaders, raising awareness of the risks arising 
from inadequate ammunition management, as well as min-
imum safety and security remedies. Most recently, the UN 
SaferGuard Programme published three support guides to 
make the IATG more accessible. Besides enhancing the un-
derstanding of the IATG, these resources increase their us-
ability within national ammunition management systems.
• Critical Path Guide to the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines assists users in navigating the 
principles, methodology, and technical content of the 
IATG.8
• A Guide to Developing National Standards for 
Ammunition Management supports States in the de-
velopment of IATG-based national standards and an 
organizational framework for effective, coordinated, 
and sustainable national ammunition management.9
• Utilizing the IATG in Conflict-Affected and Low- 
Capacity Environments offers guidance on how basic am-
munition stockpile safety and security can be improved 
in conflict-affected and low-capacity environments.10
To promote comprehensive and sustainable application of 
the IATG, translation of the IATG and its support resources 
into different languages is an important requirement. While 
the full version of the IATG is available in English, Arabic, 
Portuguese, and Russian, the UN SaferGuard Programme is 
currently translating all modules and support resources into 
French and Spanish.
The IATG support documents are available for download on the 
UNODA, UNIDIR, and AMAT websites.
Image courtesy of UN SaferGuard.
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Laser-marking of 9 mm ammunition in Lima, Peru, 2018.
Image courtesy of UNLIREC.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
AND ASSISTANCE
International cooperation and assistance is often essential 
to addressing problems associated with national ammuni-
tion stockpiles. Immediate, short-term assistance interven-
tions by specialist organizations can be crucial in preventing 
humanitarian disasters. However, inadequate ammunition 
management cannot be sustainably addressed from the out-
side through only discrete activities such as the delivery of 
training packages, construction of infrastructure, and the de-
struction of stockpiles. Experience has shown that compre-
hensive, nationally-owned approaches are more effective in 
the long term, gradually establishing the required knowledge, 
capacity, and national systems for safe and secure ammuni-
tion management.7
There is an increasing number of projects aimed at devel-
oping ammunition management capacities across the globe. 
Such efforts are undertaken through multiple channels by 
various actors and sometimes involve insufficient coordi-
nation and duplication of efforts. Those States offering and 
receiving assistance, as well as organizations building capaci-
ties on the ground, would benefit from coordinating activities 
and information sharing. A number of regional organizations 
have an active role in channeling assistance and stimulating 
national buy-in. Such regional cooperation is key in consoli-
dating lessons learned from similar activities and in capitaliz-
ing on expertise relevant to other countries or organizations.3
Evaluating the impact of international cooperation and as-
sistance can be difficult. Assistance-providing States and orga-
nizations that develop coherent indicators can better observe 
and capture changes on the ground, including with regards 
to national normative frameworks, organizational struc-
tures and procedures, training and doctrine development, 
equipment and maintenance, personnel management, and fi-
nances and infrastructure.3 Besides measuring progress with 
indicators, project results should be made publicly available so 
stakeholders can better understand specific challenges and re-
spond effectively in different contexts.
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT
ADVISORY TEAM
To contribute to more effective and sustainable action on 
ammunition management, the United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) jointly es-
tablished the Ammunition Management Advisory Team 
(AMAT), a Geneva-based technical assistance mechanism. 
Eleven AMAT seeks to enhance State and regional action on 
safe and secure ammunition management in line with the 
U.N. Secretary-General’s agenda for disarmament. Besides 
providing sustainable technical support and assistance in ac-
cordance with the IATG, it contributes to making interna-
tional cooperation and assistance more coherent and effective 
by developing a global information platform on ammunition 
management capacity and by facilitating meetings to match 
needs, resources, and expertise.
A below ground level ammunition storage facility in 
Bagram, Afghanistan, constructed by The HALO Trust.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, governments have increasingly en-
gaged in ammunition safety and security topics, and demand 
for technical management support is on the rise. A growing 
number of States as well as international and regional NGOs 
now provide financial support and technical assistance in this 
area. The financial implications and technical capacity re-
quirements in safe and effective management of ammunition 
are often significant. In this regard, international cooperation 
and assistance has become a central component of efforts to 
address ammunition safety and security. These efforts have 
been strengthened by the availability of the U.N.-developed, 
universally accepted IATG.
While in recent years there have been important develop-
ments in this area, major challenges remain. Many States con-
tinue to be at high risk of diversion and accidental explosions. 
Holistic approaches need to incorporate greater awareness of 
the risks from inadequate ammunition management, along 
with acceptance of responsibility for risk mitigation, develop-
ment of appropriate laws, policies and procedures, as well as 
capacity-building.
States with limited capacities can benefit from IATG appli-
cation by incrementally reducing risk, thus making com-
munities safer and more secure. The IATG can be used for 
developing national frameworks, prioritizing those activity 
areas that need to be addressed urgently. Establishing national 
strategies, standards, and action plans that reflect the IATG in 
their goals and incremental targets is critical for a sustainable 
ammunition management system and may also attract exter-
nal support and resources.
The availability of the IATG in an increasing number of lan-
guages as well as the expansion of supporting resources un-
der the UN SaferGuard Programme make the IATG more 
accessible and facilitate their application at the national level. 
The newly established AMAT seeks to accelerate global out-
reach and capacity-building efforts in line with the IATG 
and promotes effective and sustainable international co-
operation and assistance. This has significant potential to 
improve national ammunition management policy and 
practices in many countries.
States and organizations continue enhancing their engage-
ment in the area of safe and secure ammunition manage-
ment. Deepened commitment, increased awareness, more 
effective coordination of efforts, and the availability of con-
sistent technical capacity to provide assistance are key com-
ponents for achieving sustainable change on the ground. 
See endnotes page 62
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Dealing with stockpiles of surplus ammunition1 re-mains a key challenge for many African countries. In the last 10 years, at least 38 ammunition sites across 
Africa reportedly experienced unplanned explosions, causing 
injury and loss of life as well as significant damage to infra-
structure and the environment.2 Numerous reasons such as 
overstocking, inadequate storage facilities due to insufficient 
resources, inadequate capabilities of storage sites, or simply 
unstable ammunition may be the cause of these unplanned 
detonations. These factors are often exacerbated by person-
nel having a limited knowledge and awareness, or insufficient 
training on relevant subjects such as explosive compatibility 
groups or ammunition life cycles. Regardless of the reasons 
outlined previously, the destruction of surplus and/or dete-
riorating ammunition is required as part of a general physical 
security and stockpile management (PSSM) regime, in par-
ticular to reduce the risk of unplanned explosions at ammu-
nitions sites (UEMS). 
During the past decade the international community pro-
vided substantial funding for surplus destruction activities 
to countries in sub-Saharan Africa. However, this funding 
was primarily used by external implementing agencies to de-
stroy existing stockpiles, rather than equipping the countries 
in which destruction activities are undertaken with the skill 
sets and tools to manage their own destruction programs, 
thus lessening their dependence on foreign expertise. This 
article is therefore meant to encourage donors, implementing 
agencies, and beneficiaries to consider interventions through 
a more locally sustainable lens and involve local parties more 
inclusively in the design and implementation of ammunition 
by Joe Farha [ BICC ], Matthias Krötz [ BICC ], and Einas Osman Abdalla Mohammed [ African Union 
Commission ]
More Bang for their Buck:
Enhancing the Sustainability 
of Surplus Ammunition 
Destruction Programs
(Above) Degraded and dysfunctional ammunition is often stored in munition depots across the continent despite its 
unserviceability. Reasons for the storage of degraded ammunition are due to limited awareness, care, or destruction 
capacities.
All images courtesy of Nikhil Acharya, BICC.
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destruction processes. In order to affect a real change in sur-
plus ammunition management, it is not enough to just deal 
with existing surplus stockpiles; the community needs to en-
sure that partnering countries are able to independently pre-
vent the future buildup of surplus stockpiles. 
This article draws attention to the common procedures and 
practices of implementing agencies, partnering countries, 
and donors, before outlining lessons learned and suggesting 
potential ways of creating more participatory, sustainable, 
surplus-destruction projects across Africa.
ISSUES WITH CURRENT APPROACHES TO 
THE MANAGEMENT AND DESTRUCTION 
OF SURPLUS MUNITION
 The need for local ownership over the management and 
destruction processes of surplus stockpiles of ammunition is 
reflected in myriad reports, international best practice stan-
dards, as well as relevant legal instruments in this field in-
cluding the Bamako Declaration Article 3(iv);3 the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention 
Article 17;4 Kinshasa Convention Article 14; Nairobi 
Protocol Article 80;6 and the Silencing the Guns Continental 
Plan of Action on the Control of Illicit Small Arms and 
Light Weapons. The International Ammunition Technical 
Guidelines implicitly call for the development of local capa-
bilities in this area (10.2.5 and 10.2.6),7 and external imple-
menting partners conduct relatively short-term training and 
capacity-building projects. However this often happens in an 
ad hoc manner, depending on the nature, scale, resources of 
the intervention, and strategic priorities of the donors, and is 
not always approached with considerations of long-term sus-
tainability in mind. 
There is a need and desire for the skills and infrastructure 
gaps in this area to be filled by local, national, and region-
al bodies. This is needed in order to address the issue of am-
munition destruction at an early enough stage to prevent the 
build-up of surpluses before they become a security and safety 
threat to the state and civilian population in the surrounding 
areas. For this to occur the capabilities must be developed and 
maintained at the local, national, or regional levels. 
Short-term projects and interventions may fail to address 
related gaps in management and destruction processes out-
side of the narrow timeframe in which the implementing 
agencies operate. These capability gaps stem partly from the 
way in which donors operate. Thorough ammunition-life- 
cycle management is an expensive and time-consuming pro-
cess, thus donors tend to favor short-term projects focusing on 
the destruction of specific stockpiles. As well as limiting the 
possibilities of embedding a national system capable of iden-
tifying and destroying surpluses or degraded ammunition, 
interventions may only focus on parts of the destruction re-
quirements that a country needs. This approach may be driven 
by a number of factors including the issue that implementing 
agencies will follow donor parameters and focus purely on the 
material destruction of ammunition instead of devoting the 
necessary time and expertise to building capacity of the local 
technical staff and decision makers. 
Additionally, countries often request assistance that is lim-
ited to expensive infrastructure or equipment procurement. 
For donors, assistance with actual destruction activities is 
comparatively cheaper; however, capacity development, risk 
awareness education, and the development of locally appli-
cable tools and institutional learning to generate knowledge 
for domestic security agencies are being neglected.7 Although 
the provision of relevant equipment is often a necessary com-
ponent of destruction programs, such equipment is often not 
used or maintained once the intervention from the imple-
menting agency or donor concludes. This in turn decreases 
the likelihood of future funding, as donors question the com-
mitment of the recipient. Countries receiving support should 
therefore not be passively involved in the implementation of 
activities by foreign intervention agencies but must operate in 
true partnership with them by actively taking part in the de-
sign and implementation processes.
These approaches may lead to uneven coverage of destruc-
tion activities, with assistance being concentrated in cer-
tain regions and focusing on specific types of intervention. 
These interventions may be more attractive from a short-term 
“marketing” perspective, producing swift, publicly verifiable 
outputs rather than more anonymous long-term benefits. 
Assistance measures therefore often support physical mea-
sures such as the destruction of surplus ammunition or the 
construction/rehabilitation of ammunition sites in countries 
that are already of interest to the international communi-
ty rather than those with more basic infrastructure or with 
complex bureaucracies. It is therefore the case that funding 
tends to cluster around prominently positioned countries who 
may not be able to absorb the assistance provided while other 
countries with similar or higher demands command less at-
tention and do not receive assistance in overcoming existing 
difficulties relating to surplus destruction. 
The questions of strategic relationships and/or geopolitical 
dynamics also feed into determining which states may benefit 
from intervention support. These points all have the poten-
tial to create a cyclical knock-on effect: countries who do not 
receive support focus less on the very governance issues such 
as ammunition management and capacity that deter donors 
from investing in the first place. Therefore better coordina-
tion is needed between donors and established African insti-
tutions, such as the African Union, the Regional Economic 
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Communities, or regional bodies to avoid duplication and in-
effectiveness of the support provided. Apart from inefficien-
cy, duplication of efforts by different agencies and their donors 
might even hamper progress by creating competition among 
implementing agencies and undermining national ownership.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS 
As discussed, interventions are focused on the destruc-
tion of ammunition through external implementing agents. 
However, this approach may only relieve the burden for a short 
period of time, failing in the longer term to address broader 
questions relating to the material conditions and management 
activities undertaken in the intervention countries. These po-
tential gaps ultimately result in the formation of a dependency 
cycle of ongoing external interventions for ammunition sur-
plus destruction. Therefore in order to lessen the dependence 
of beneficiary states on repeated interventions from exter-
nal donors and to allow states to overcome UEMS caused by 
overcrowded unstable stockpile depots the following changes 
in approach are proposed.
Implementing agencies must work more closely with re-
spective countries in the design and execution of surplus 
destruction programs. Rather than treating surplus de-
struction as an activity in isolation, states and implement-
ing agencies may consider the design and establishment of 
joint, tailored, life-cycle-management systems for ammuni-
tion in accordance with international standards. Using this 
broader approach would involve the inclusion of PSSM into 
Surplus and damaged RPG warheads. These explosives pose a serious 
threat to the lives of storage keepers, military personnel, and 
civilians. By separating and destroying surplus ammunition,  
UEMS can be reduced significantly.
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the national curricula of relevant security forces, the devel-
opment of specific policies relating to management systems, 
as well as the introduction and implementation of functional 
standard operating procedures, all of which are necessary to 
generate functioning surplus munition destruction capabili-
ties. This is crucial, as long-term threat mitigation of surplus 
ammunition can only realistically happen through improv-
ing and streamlining the acquisition, distribution, and dis-
posal processes of ammunition. This has the double benefit of 
reducing both the costs and the risks around surplus stock-
piles, which then require further interventions to resolve. 
Additionally, specialized and explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) capacities and equipment must be acquired in order to 
build in-country capabilities. 
The onus to ensure sustainability cannot solely be the do-
nors’; beneficiary countries must also follow through on the 
commitments they give to donors. Each state has an indi-
vidual obligation to limit the risks and hazards of ammuni-
tion stockpiles, both to personnel working directly on those 
sites as well as civilians living in the surrounding areas. States 
should thus be obliged to report on their own activities in this 
area on a regular and standardized basis and should actively 
seek ways to mitigate potential risks at an early stage, rath-
er than ignoring the issues posed by increasing stockpiles.9 
Reports should be publicly available and aimed at donors, rel-
evant international mechanisms as well as stakeholders and 
implementing agencies.
For countries with capacity and capability issues where it 
may not be possible to develop or maintain EOD or arms and 
ammunition destruction expertise, states should request sup-
port from regional economic communities and regional bod-
ies dealing with these subjects to establish regional pools of 
experts—such as train-the-trainers programs to support 
national surplus management and disposal undertakings. 
Promising examples of the approaches that may be used can 
be drawn from the activities of ECOWAS and the Regional 
Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of 
Africa and Bordering States in their PSSM train-the-trainers 
programs. 
Donor countries and institutions are bound to short-term, 
high-impact timelines. Projects are thus often commissioned 
for only two-to-three years. Sustainable change is, however, 
not achieved in such a short time frame; changing personnel 
and institutional behavior requires time to adjust. Therefore, 
donors should consider committing to selected projects for a 
longer period of time, rather than distributing available fund-
ing across a larger number of countries for shorter periods. In 
order to allow partnering countries to overcome surplus 
stockpiles and the dependency on external actors in driving 
interventions, priority should be given to supporting 
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partnering countries in combating the root causes of surplus 
accumulation. This would decrease the dependency on foreign 
financial resources and capacities, a situation that is clearly in 
the interest of all donors, as financial resources can be chan-
neled into a sustainable solution, rather than a quick fix, thus 
representing more bang for donors (and taxpayers) buck than 
the current situation allows.  
See endnotes page 63
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INCREASING UNDERSTANDING 
TO REDUCE RISK
In the new International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 
07.14, risk is defined as “the effect of uncertainty on objec-
tives.”1 Uncertainty arises when we don’t have enough infor-
mation on a subject or situation to be confident about taking 
the right decisions. An important part of the overall infor-
mation and risk management process is the identification and 
use of KPIs that tell us about important aspects of our opera-
tional activity and the extent to which we are succeeding in 
pursuing goals and objectives. This article looks at the ques-
tion of KPIs within HMA. It identifies specific KPIs that are 
likely to be particularly relevant and considers both the op-
portunities that the adoption of such indicators bring as well 
as some of the risks associated with them.
Key Performance 
Indicators and HMA
by Roly Evans [ GICHD ] and David Hewitson [ Fenix Insight, Ltd ]
Photo above: Pattern-minefield clearance by MAG (Mines Advisory Group) in Mantai, Sri Lanka. The locations of cleared 
anti-personnel mines are represented by yellow pickets. Clearance of dense patterns minefields in countries such as 
Sri Lanka can give impressive KPIs such as low m²/mine cleared figures. 
Image courtesy of GICHD/Roly Evans.
Measuring performance is the norm across a range of human activities. But is it a norm in humanitari-an mine action (HMA)? Some might suggest that 
it is. However, if we measure our performance, it is unclear 
whether we do so in a standardized way so that meaningful 
comparisons can be made. HMA lacks standardized indica-
tors, whether it is for items of explosive ordnance (EO) found 
and destroyed, m2 of land released, or more general outcomes 
such as internally displaced persons returning to an area once 
cleared. Indicators can of course be ignored, misused, misre-
ported, misunderstood. The playing field for operators may not 
be level. However, this is not a reason not to use key perfor-
mance indicators (KPIs); it is a reason for standardizing their 
use. The time is overdue for mine action to develop standard 
indicators with agreed definitions in order to measure, under-
stand, and compare performance more accurately.
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PAST PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT 
IN HMA
Performance measurement has a 
mixed history in HMA. In the ear-
ly years of HMA, the promotion and 
pursuit of individual performance in-
dicators led to distortion of some man-
agement decision-making. The pursuit 
of m2 of cleared land sometimes result-
ed in the expenditure of time and mon-
ey clearing large areas that contained 
no explosive hazards. Money was of-
ten wasted on areas that need not have 
been a priority at the time or that were 
not put to subsequent use. Chasing the 
number of mines cleared sometimes led 
to the clearance of areas that had little 
or no impact on affected populations. 
Opportunities were missed to maxi-
mize the benefits provided to affected people. 
In the 2000s, attention turned to how to avoid clearing 
land that did not contain hazards. Improved methods and ap-
proaches coalesced into the concepts known collectively as 
land release. More recently, additional efforts have been ap-
plied to concepts of results-based management and the need 
to understand better the outcomes and impacts accruing from 
the release of land.2
Historically, the focus on the figures m2 “cleared” was under-
standable. The measurements were consistent with the intent 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), Article 
5, where State Parties undertook “to ensure the destruction of 
all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction 
or control ...”3 However, in isolation, m2 don’t necessarily re-
veal much about how successful and efficient work has been. 
For a given area of land that was cleared, how would we decide 
whether the effort to clear that land was reasonable? Would 
it be m2/item of EO cleared? If so what level of effort would 
we deem acceptable? 100 m2/item, 1,000 m2/item, 10,000 m2/
item, 100,000 m2/item? The type of item is, of course, relevant. 
One thousand m2/anti-personnel mine might be deemed rea-
sonable, 1,000 m2/7.62 x 39 mm cartridge probably wouldn’t.
In the absence of clearly defined standards, operators often 
choose their own indicators, establishing their own rules for 
counting key data, and interpreting data reporting require-
ments in whatever ways seem to make the most sense or that 
yield the most favorable figures. Does any IMAS or National 
Mine Action Standard (NMAS) currently list standard KPIs 
for reporting? How many standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) detail standardized KPIs for reporting? The result is 
a situation in which there is a great deal of uncertainty about 
what constitutes “good” performance across the sector.
STANDARDIZATION 
OF KPIs IN HMA
Standardizing KPIs in HMA would bring important ben-
efits. Donors and national mine action authorities (NMAAs) 
would be able to compare operational outputs and outcomes 
more easily. Operators would be more confident about dem-
onstrating performance on a level playing field. The challenge 
is to agree which performance indicators should be standard-
ized. Some core KPIs, especially in terms of land release, may 
be easy to identify while others might have more situation-
specific value and be deemed discretionary. As a first step, it 
could be sensible to develop a set of core KPIs that can mea-
sure operational performance—especially but not exclusively 
in the context of land release—and a set of recognized discre-
tionary KPIs that are available for use as and when relevant. 
Adopting standardized KPIs brings risks and challenges too. 
In order for data not to be misrepresented, common “count-
ing rules” should be agreed and established, dictating clearly 
and unambiguously how data is to be measured, collected, re-
corded, and reported.
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Figure 1. Analysis of m2/mine by number of mines at site, including “best fit” 
curves, Afghanistan pre–2009 in blue, 2009–2012 in red: Survey Action Center 
(SAC) Afghanistan Database Project 2012. The fact that the red line is lower 
than the blue line implies an increase in average land release targeting effi-
ciency within the pre- and post-2009 figures. Base data was provided by the 
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA).
Figure courtesy of David Hewitson.
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POTENTIAL CORE KPIs
KPIs selected as core should relate directly and fundamen-
tally to questions of success. In HMA success typically means 
working safely, minimizing environmental impact, complet-
ing work on time and on budget, ensuring that no hazard 
items are left in released land, and helping achieve results that 
make a real difference to affected people.
TARGETING OF EFFORT: M2/
EO item (Disaggregated)
The area cleared per hazard item is an indicator of efficiency 
in the targeting of assets. Mines in a well-recorded, intact, reg-
ular pattern are likely to be relatively easy to locate. Clearance 
work can focus on the specific rows where the mines are found, 
and decisions about when to stop work can be made ear-
ly and with confidence. The m2/mine KPI is likely to be very 
low (possibly in single figures). In an area subject to a cluster- 
munition strike, unexploded submunitions may be widely 
separated (within an overall footprint) and exhibit a limit-
ed pattern. The m2/submunition figure is likely to be higher 
(perhaps hundreds). In an area containing only one or two nui-
sance landmines, the figure may be over ten thousand. Figures 
for the clearance of general explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
may be different again. Disaggregation of EO type is essential 
to ensure that comparisons are like-for-like and to provide op-
erations managers with meaningful information.
On the one hand, m2/EO provides an indication of how 
easy (or difficult) it is to define the extent and distribu-
tion of contamination within an area. On the other, it re-
f lects how successful operators are at defining the extent 
and arrangement of the contamination. Two organizations 
approaching a similar area of contamination could yield 
different m2/item results ref lecting the general availability 
of information, how well Non-technical Survey (NTS) was 
conducted, how well Technical Survey/clearance work drew 
on the results of the NTS, and how well decision-making 
worked during site operations.4 
M2/EO brings significant benefits and advantages. The first 
is that the two pieces of data necessary to calculate the KPI (m2 
and number of items) are perhaps the only two pieces of data 
that at least should be recorded at almost every land release 
site since the beginning of modern HMA. Secondly, analysis 
of this indicator in a number of countries suggests that, espe-
cially with respect to landmines, there is a remarkably consis-
tent relationship between the number of mines found at a site 
and the amount of land that is investigated (Figure 2). Where 
there are few mines, it is relatively difficult to find them effi-
ciently; where there are very many, it is much easier. The gen-
eral statement may be obvious, but the nature of the curve 
that arises from the analysis suggests the potential to establish 
benchmark figures that could be applicable across many or 
all programs. Benchmarks need not generally be used as tar-
gets but instead reflect typical performance across a range of 
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Figure 2. M2/mine data from Tajikistan (in red) showing the generally close alignment with the data from Afghanistan 
(in blue): Survey Action Center Tajikistan Land Release Project Report 2011. Base data was provided by MACCA and 
the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC).
Figure courtesy of David Hewitson.
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operators, regions, and programs. In doing so, they help HMA 
managers understand where the performance of their opera-
tions sits relative to sector performance as a whole, identify-
ing both occasions when above-benchmark performance could 
usefully be shared to help others benefit, and those when the 
reasons for below-benchmark performance should be ques-
tioned. With improved collection and analysis of performance 
data, a range of benchmarks could be established for different 
types of contamination, activities, and circumstances.
While m2/EO item helps us understand the efficiency of 
clearance activity, it also provides an indication of the effec-
tiveness of decisions and activity undertaken earlier in the 
overall land release process: a low m2/EO item figure is also 
likely to reflect effective NTS and operational planning. KPIs 
often help us understand more than one aspect of an opera-
tional process, providing information about efficiency in one 
respect, effectiveness in another, and perhaps progress or com-
pliance in yet another. 
PRODUCTIVITY: M2/Asset/Time
Productivity, defined as the rate of production, has been 
widely measured in HMA for most of its history. It has clear 
value but needs to be handled carefully if it is to provide use-
ful, comparable information about performance. The KPI 
can tell us the rate at which ground is being searched, how 
search rates change over time, how rates differ between sites 
and teams, and how rates relate to original planning assump-
tions. However, KPIs rarely tell the full story in isolation, and 
comparisons need to be done in context. If one team searches 
more m2 in a given period of time than another, it does not 
necessarily mean it is more efficient. It does mean that opera-
tions managers should understand why such differences arise 
and be prepared to investigate if the causes of differences are 
not readily understandable.
Productivity KPIs are especially susceptible to misun-
derstanding if they do not offer like-for-like comparisons. 
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Figure 3. M2 productivity/deminer, ratioed to a standard six-hour day equivalent (to ensure like-for-like comparability). 
A general upward trend in the KPI indicates deminers becoming familiar with site conditions. Stand out peaks in pro-
ductivity were associated with areas where adjacent mines were blown in situ, breaking up nearby soil and vegetation, 
making it much easier for deminers to progress.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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Figure 4. Mines found/day, a relatively clean site profile associated with a pattern minefield.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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FIELD NOTES
Some programs choose to use m2/team/week; others use 
m2/deminer/day; others m2/deminer/hour. Not every team 
may be the same at all times; team numbers may f luctu-
ate through sickness, leave rostering, or logistic constraints. 
The working week and day may vary ref lecting weather con-
ditions, travelling time, security issues, and other contex-
tual factors. KPIs work best when they use unambiguous 
base data (m2, the deminer, and the hour are all uniquely 
defined), but even then it is important to ensure that com-
mon counting rules are adopted. If the same m2 has been 
processed by machine, dog, and deminer, is it counted three 
times, under separate KPIs, or once under a single land re-
leased heading for instance?
Productivity in land release is also strongly influenced by 
local circumstances and conditions. High levels of metal con-
tamination can require more time-consuming excavations, 
slowing progress. Metal contamination might be such that the 
only option is full excavation, an even slower search process. 
Contamination type, slope, vegetation, soil type, and ground 
conditions (e.g., hard, wet, etc.) may also have a significant effect. 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT KPIs
A number of simple quality management KPIs are also of 
value to the sector. Typically these center on the occurrence 
and severity of nonconformities, identified by organization-
al unit (e.g., a team), date, and management system aspect; 
whether it relates to quality, safety, or the environment; which 
standard or SOP requirement has not been satisfied, etc. Such 
KPIs have value when comparing teams in the same operating 
environment, looking for trends in performance, and when 
identifying aspects of standards or procedures that seem to 
be causing difficulties. However, there are potential problems 
when trying to compare differing quality management re-
gimes in different countries. There is also the issue that many 
NMAS do not provide detail on the severity of different types 
of nonconformity. Accredited SOPs effectively list working re-
quirements, but what requirements relate to major, minor, and 
critical nonconformities is also too often not specified clear-
ly and consistently enough. Some contracts do specify, and 
IMAS 07.40 provides general guidance, but this is not univer-
sally applied. More clarity will be required in order for fair 
KPIs for quality management to be developed.
One quality KPI that may merit particular attention is EO 
remaining in released land. The absence of EO is a primary 
indicator of effectiveness of the land release process. If a haz-
ard item is missed it indicates that the land release process 
has failed in some regard. Deciding what to do in the event 
that this specific nonconformity KPI is “non-zero” relies upon 
a thorough and reliable investigation and root cause analysis 
leading to appropriate and effective corrective and preventive 
actions.5 This is an important indicator, but one that needs to 
be used with care by authorities, donors, and clients if opera-
tors are not to be frightened into avoiding or concealing dec-
larations to avoid punitive measures.6 
MAKING A DIFFERENCE: 
OUTCOME INDICATORS
Land release is also effective when it releases land that is 
used to yield developmental value. Developing meaningful 
outcome indicators to improve understanding of the benefits 
that arise from HMA is a challenging task, one that has yet to 
be meaningfully addressed by donors, authorities, and opera-
tors within HMA. However, even in the absence of an agreed 
selection of such outcome KPIs, there are some indicators that 
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Figure 5. Mines found/day, an irregular profile associated with a mined area that is harder to “unlock.”
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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could be adopted. The simplest is a comparison of the use of 
land following release against the expectation of its use reflect-
ed in the prioritization and planning process. If land is used in 
the way that was expected, it indicates that the overall tasking 
and land release process has been effective. If land is not used 
at all, or used for some unexpected purpose, then it indicates 
some failing in the overall system. Other KPIs that could be 
considered include the number of IDPs (internally displaced 
persons) returning/ha of released land, or number of IDPs 
returning/released buildings. HMA KPIs could potentially 
be developed and agreed that link directly to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs).
POSSIBLE DISCRETIONARY KPIs
Other KPIs may be useful and should be considered.
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Figure 6. Progress chart showing a period when the production rate fell below the target line, followed by the de-
ployment of additional clearance assets to increase the production rate and final completion around the target date.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
SITE CHARACTERISTICS: ITEMS 
FOUND PER WORKING DAY
Plotting the number of items found each working day 
brings a time-based, rather than a geographical perspective 
to land release. Once again, disaggregation of data is impor-
tant. In a mined area, the shape of the KPI profile provides 
additional indications about how successfully the extent and 
distribution of contamination is being predicted. At regu-
lar, easy-to-define sites, a “clean” pattern might be expected. 
There may be a few mines at the beginning during “breach-
ing” toward mine rows, a larger number during clearance in 
the main mined area, and a period when no mines are found 
at the end during “fade out” prior to the decision to declare 
the site complete. 
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Figure 7. Duration variance by task. Tasks below the zero line were finished faster than expected; those above it later. 
In a perfectly planned project, all tasks would show as zero. In reality various “real world” factors may affect this KPI.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd.
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lies, and statistics.” This is of course not a good argument for 
not using statistics or KPIs. It is, however, a good argument for 
not misusing data and indicators, as KPIs must be interpreted 
in context. Taken in isolation they can give rise to misleading 
or invalid conclusions. Comparison of the m2/mine figures be-
tween a pattern and nuisance minefield could lead to an as-
sumption that one was inefficient compared with the other, 
but nuisance minefields also need to be reduced and cleared. 
Different field conditions (i.e., with varying contamination and 
vegetation levels) may explain significant variation in perfor-
mance figures at apparently similar sites. There is currently no 
standardized way of recording field conditions to help under-
stand variations in performance figures. The ability to disag-
gregate performance data by site characteristics would provide 
further support to improved understanding and decision- 
making. The nature of the contamination present at a site also 
influences performance. One minefield might contain easy to 
detect metal-cased, anti-vehicle mines, another minimum-
metal, anti-personnel mines that are extremely hard to detect. 
Other considerations include how dangerous a mine is during 
excavation and removal and whether booby-traps are present 
as well as the effects of aging and degradation.
The results of one KPI often help us monitor the quality of 
another. Much like the navigator of a ship looking for con-
stant logical consistency between different sources of infor-
mation about the position of the vessel, any inconsistency in 
the implications of different KPIs demands management at-
tention to find out why. If the m2/EO item for a typical team 
working in average conditions is low (implying that items are 
Metal contamination is one of the key factors affecting 
m2/searcher/day. The image above shows an area where 
the battle area clearance (BAC) searcher has excavated 
many times for each m² in the search for explosive sub-
munitions. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
BAC on a hillside in southern Lebanon. The rocky nature 
of the ground, the vegetation, and the steep slope, along 
with the hot working conditions, are all factors that might 
affect KPIs such as m²/searcher/day. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
At sites where less information is available, or where it is 
harder to predict where contamination may be present, less 
regular profiles are likely.
PROGRESS: Proportion of  
Task Achievement
The percentage of task objectives achieved against time is 
one of the simplest indicators, but it is often ignored in HMA. 
It requires managers to predict both output at a site and the 
expected duration of work, which is not always a straight- 
forward task. Even where no deadline is set, or where there 
may be some uncertainty about the volume of work expected 
at the site, HMA managers should be encouraged to set figures 
and monitor progress toward them, even if time and output 
targets need to be updated in light of new information.
PLANNING VARIANCE
Comparisons between when tasks are expected to be imple-
mented against when they actually take place, and of planned 
duration against actual duration, provide indications of the 
reliability of planning processes. As with any KPI, there may 
be good reasons for differences between planned and actual 
activity, but managers should generally expect the reliability 
of planning to improve over time.
VIEWING KPIs IN CONTEXT
One of the erroneous arguments against the systematic use 
of KPIs in HMA is that they can be presented in a misleading 
way along the lines of the old apocryphal phrase, “lies, damn 
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likely to be found relatively frequently), 
but the finds/day figure is also low (im-
plying that items are not found often) 
then it indicates a possible inconsisten-
cy requiring management attention—
there may be many acceptable reasons, 
but there may also be an underlying 
data collection and reporting problem.
DATA COLLECTION
Indicators require accurate data. 
Unfortunately, HMA operators do not 
always collect enough data to a sufficient 
standard to generate meaningful KPIs. 
The first step therefore in generating any 
meaningful KPI is the collection of ac-
curate and relevant data. In selecting 
what we want to monitor by means of 
KPIs, we are selecting what data we wish 
to collect. The use of electronic devices 
such as tablets and mobile phones has 
revolutionized reporting in HMA in the 
last decade. The standardized data input 
and the real-time view of operational 
data such methods enable—often im-
mediately represented on dashboards—
has been a huge help to the sector in 
several countries. However, regardless 
of the benefits of technology, the key 
to such data collection is the design of 
the actual forms, whether they are elec- 
tronic or paper-based. 
It is no exaggeration to suggest that 
forms are among the most important 
documents in HMA yet little attention 
is given to their design. A form should 
seek to capture, as accurately as possi-
ble, the necessary data. Long forms are 
rarely filled out carefully and there is 
a finite amount of data that operators 
can practically extract from the field. 
The imperative is therefore to select 
the most relevant data to capture. It is 
a choice, with data priorities preferably 
reflected in the forms. Ideally, an opera-
tor should decide the KPIs they wish to 
measure while designing the forms that 
will capture the all-important data in 
A SafeLane Global Ltd site supervisor in a waterlogged minefield west of 
Mount Longdon, the Falkland Islands. Weather and the resulting ground condi-
tions can have a significant effect on search and clearance KPIs. 
Image courtesy of GICHD/Roly Evans.
Clearance of an AP minefield in dense vegetation. Such vegetation will signifi-
cantly reduce the m²/deminer/day. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
the first place. Designing forms might not be the most glamorous job in HMA, but 
it is among the most important.
STANDARDIZED DATA REPORTING
Meaningful indicators also require standardized data reporting. The principles 
of common counting rules and like-for-like comparisons are essential, but these 
are not necessarily applied in HMA. For example, m2 reported as land released of-
ten leads to the suspicion that the figure represents mostly cancelled land, a prod-
uct that is much cheaper to produce than m2 cleared. M2 reported as cleared can be 
heavily inflated and doesn’t always represent the area that has been fully searched or 
where hazards have actually been removed. It is still not clear that m2 indicated as 
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either cancelled, reduced, or cleared is reported consistently. 
For example, say an organization physically cleared 15 per-
cent of a confirmed hazardous area (CHA) in order to find 
100 anti-personnel mines a record indicates is present, how 
would the other 85 percent be reported? Would it be counted 
as cancelled, reduced, or cleared? There are reasonable argu-
ments for each option. However, there are not yet common 
counting rules for such a scenario.
The reporting of EO is another area where all is not nec-
essarily what it seemed to be in the past. Often a very gener-
al figure of unexploded ordnance (UXO) might be reported. 
What that type of UXO might be is too often unspecified. 
Sometimes it can simply be small arms ammunition, which 
in any case is not UXO but abandoned explosive ordnance 
(AXO), or it can be larger caliber items that have not been 
armed or damaged. It is notable that much that is found on 
the battlefield is AXO. Firstly, correct reporting of ERW un-
der Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons defines ERW as either UXO or AXO.7 Best practice 
would require adherence to this protocol. Secondly, if oper-
ators routinely recorded whether an item of ordnance was 
armed or not, better systematic risk management would be 
possible. The issue has further been emphasized by the lack 
of standardized reporting of IED contamination, where the 
need for databases to act as a tool for risk or threat assessment 
is even greater. In Iraq and Syria there have been instances of 
IED components such a 9 V batteries being reported as IEDs 
in databases, leading to situations where reported figures on 
IEDs are false. Once again, the need to establish common 
counting rules and like-for-like comparisons is clear.
INTEGRATING KPIs 
INTO DAILY WORK
KPIs are already being used by a num-
ber of clearance organizations who mon-
itor their operational outputs by using 
dashboards. Some organizations integrate 
graphical representation of KPIs into key 
reporting documents. This way, the use of 
KPIs is fully integrated into the work of 
the program and has become a norm. 
Dashboards are becoming standard-
ized across HMA and can be an effective 
way of easily monitoring selected KPIs. 
If more KPIs are standardized across the 
An M-14 minimum-metal, anti-personnel mine from a 
site where the vegetation was removed through burn-
ing. Comparisons of m²/deminer/dour, m²/searcher/day, 
or mines found/day must take into account the nature of 
EO found in order to be valid. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
IED components in Iraq, March 2016. HMA is still to stan-
dardise how such devices may be reported into operator 
and national databases, not only to allow better report-
ing under Article 7 of the APMBC but also to enable such 
databases to be used meaningfully as risk management/
threat assessment tools. 
Image courtesy of Ollie Shepherd.
• Areas.
Total area released 7,929 m2
Total area technically investigated 841 m2
% area technically investigated 11%
• Land release process performed  
(key performance indicators/ratios).
Average demining rate 10.40 m2/deminer/day (6hr)
Average efficiency 5.88 m2/mine
Average deminer day/mine 0.57 deminer days (6hr)
BAC rate 648 m2/deminer/day (6hr)
• Quality non-conformances, complaints, accidents. Nil
• Recommendations for improvement. Nil
• Follow-up actions arising from the review. Nil
Figure 8. KPIs integrated into the Management Review of the Site Implementation Plan document for Minefield 096 in 
the Falkland Islands, December 2017. Note the KPIs selected to be recorded in this key document include total area 
released, total area “technically investigated,” percentage “technically investigated,” average daily deminer rate, aver-
age efficiency expressed in m²/mine, average deminer days/mine, and the BAC rate for areas of the CHA not con-
taminated with mines.
Figure courtesy of Fenix Insight Ltd and SafeLane Global Ltd.
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sector, dashboards showing comparative performance between 
operators at a national level will become easier to generate.
CONCLUSION
Assessing KPIs for operations analysis typically involves 
some form of comparison. For any form of comparison to be 
credible requires standardization. Basic KPIs that help us ana-
lyze operations in context should be welcomed by all in HMA, 
including donors, operators, and NMAAs.
This article has only briefly covered some of the more main-
stream HMA KPIs that the industry might wish to consider 
formally adopting. Relevant KPIs not covered include report-
ing KPIs (e.g., proportion of reports accepted/rejected), acci-
dent KPIs, cost-related KPIs (a metric that has been subject 
to significant debate over the years in HMA), open burning 
open demolition (OBOD) KPIs such as the amount of explo-
sive stores used relative to devices destroyed, and gender and 
diversity KPIs that typically reflect sex and age disaggregated 
data (SADD). These metrics could easily be deemed core KPIs 
and should be considered.
The scope of this subject is extensive but not always easy to 
address, and it is likely any progress to standardize KPIs will 
be incremental, possibly with an initial portion of core KPIs 
being agreed upon, accompanied by some discretionary KPIs 
being suggested. The development of a modest number of stan-
dardized KPIs, viewed strictly in context, is long overdue. 
Development of such KPIs could be done relatively quickly. It 
is time that HMA caught up with other industries. 
See endnotes page 63
Roly Evans
Advisor, Land Release, Operational Efficiency, and  
Training Development
GICHD
Roly Evans is an Advisor in Land Release, 
Operational Efficiency, and Training 
Development in the Risk Management 
Division at the Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). He 
also covers training issues and convention-
al explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in-
cluding the Collaborative ORDnance data 
repository (CORD). He has worked in the 
fields of survey, clearance, EOD, and physical security and stockpile 
management in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and 
Southeast Asia.
Figure 9. NPA Vietnam Analytical Dashboard showing KPIs concerned with the survey and clearance of areas contam-
inated by cluster munition remnants. 
Figure courtesy of Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
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There are numerous documents available online relating to the use of thermite systems for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). However, most of the documents are 
either scientifically focused or address specific technical ques-
tions. This article provides broader practical information for 
mine action operators at the field and program levels.
Previously employed on a relatively small scale over the last 
five years, use of thermite as opposed to explosives for the de-
struction of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
has increased over the last five years. This has been driven by 
greater engagement across the sector in countries with unstable 
security situations, and places with more restrictive legislation 
on the holding and use of explosives by mine action operators. 
In the past decade, The HALO Trust (HALO) has used ther-
mite throughout the world, from Colombia to the Middle East, 
learning numerous lessons and best practices. The use of ther-
mite will continue to expand across the sector, improving its 
cost effectiveness and expanding operator’s knowledge of how 
to best employ the technology.
by Robert Syfret and 
Chris Cooper [ The HALO Trust ]
USE OF THERMITE IN MINE ACTION
In general terms, thermite is a mixture of chemicals that 
burn at a temperature of approximately 3,500°F/1,927°C, al-
though there can be significant variation.1 The mixture is 
typically composed of a fuel, such as aluminum or magne-
sium, and an oxidizer such as iron oxide. Thermite compo-
sitions require an ignition temperature of several thousand 
degrees, which vary according to the constituent chemi-
cals.2 Thermite has been used for many years commercially, 
most commonly to weld together railway tracks. As a non-
explosive with minimal military use other than for low- 
order techniques, thermite cannot be used as an homemade 
explosive (HME).3 The hazard classification of particular 
systems may vary according to specifics of manufacture; 
however, they will typically be Class 4.1 hazardous materials 
(flammable solids).4 Some variants are supplied unmixed, in 
which case the separate chemicals may not even have a haz-
ard classification. It should be noted that the packing group 
may vary if starter (ignition) systems are built into the item 
Practical 
Notes on the 
Application 
of Thermite 
Systems in 
Mine Action
A RendSafe crucible.
Image courtesy of Suzanne Barlow/RendSafe.
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rather than packaged separately and assembled by the opera-
tor prior to use (T-Jet systems, for example, are provided as in 
the latter configuration).
The use of thermite in mine action has grown over the last 
two decades, and is now used globally in the field. Information 
from manufacturers shows it has been used in Australia, 
Cambodia, Colombia, Hong Kong, Iraq, Kosovo, Libya, 
Mozambique, Palau, Spain, Somalia, Somaliland, South 
Sudan, Syria, the United Kingdom, and Yemen; this list is not 
exhaustive. It has not, however, become the industry stan-
dard, as there are currently several disadvantages in its em-
ployment as an EOD tool when compared to high explosives 
(HE). These points are noted in the pros and cons paragraph. 
Having said this, companies producing thermite systems are 
making rapid advances and show keen interest in customer 
feedback while addressing previously-raised issues. 
TYPES OF THERMITE SYSTEMS 
AND MANUFACTURERS
There are numerous thermite systems available that are 
manufactured around the world. They can be broken down 
into two basic types: molten flowing metals (molten penetra-
tors) and pyrotechnical directional flares (thermite flares). In 
flare systems, the thermite is packed into a tube with a nozzle 
at one end. The heat of the flame produced is focused in order 
to cut the casing and ignite the explosive contents within. 
Most molten penetrators consist of a crucible placed above the 
target. The thermite placed in the crucible produces a super- 
heated metal that drips through a hole in the bottom onto the 
item, burning a hole through the casing and igniting any ex-
plosive contents via direct contact. Other versions without 
crucibles are also available.
It is not possible to give a complete list of available systems 
here; however, a contact list of manufacturers is provided at 
the end of this article. 
PROS, CONS, AND PRACTICALITIES 
OF THERMITE
The most important feature for mine action programs is 
that thermite is not classed as an explosive. This means ther-
mite can be used in places where insecurity or regulatory re-
gimes make HE either illegal or extremely inadvisable. Its 
storage bears minimal infrastructure burden; and the trans-
port categorization means most systems are suitable for air 
freight, making logistics chains and planning far easier. The 
first of these factors is of such significance that it is likely to 
drive the expansion of use more than any other. The down-
sides of thermite in comparison to explosives are its cost, the 
time it takes to carry out the final disposal of an item, and 
the limitations in its application, for example against more 
A T-Jet thermite flare.
Image courtesy of Chris Cooper.
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complex ERW such as rocket motors. The following practical 
lessons have been learned by HALO, and should be of use to 
programs thinking of introducing thermite in the field:
Security. The closer mine action programs work to the con-
flict period, the greater the security implications of holding ex-
plosives and training staff in their use. In some locations the 
possession of explosives would place mine action operators at 
extreme risk of robbery by non-state armed groups or detention 
by local security services. In these instances, the option of us-
ing thermite may be what makes a clearance program possible.
Transportation. As noted previously, most thermite systems 
are designed to be transportable by air freight; however, differ-
ent sizes or weights of particular models affect the cost of doing 
so, which must be accounted for when comparing unit costs to 
a program of one system over another. 
Storage. Storage of thermite is hugely less restrictive, expen-
sive, and logistically challenging than the storage of explosives. 
Deflagration of target. Thermite can be used to attempt 
to target the fuze or booster of an item to produce a high- 
order detonation as soon as possible, or conversely to try and 
have as much explosive in the item as possible deflagrate prior 
to the heat causing the detonation of the explosive train. When 
used against anti-tank mines, it is possible to burn out a large 
proportion of the explosive prior to detonation, but there is a 
tendency for the combination of heat and pressure that builds 
during the burning to result in a “deflagration to detonation” 
transition of some of the fill. In situations where a munition is 
in an area where a high order is undesirable, the attempted use 
of deflagration can be a good option, but it cannot be guaran-
teed and must not be attempted unless the consequences of a 
complete detonation can be mitigated to an acceptable degree. 
Soak periods. As with normal demolitions, a soak period 
after the last smoke seen at the target should be scrupulously 
observed. On many occasions in Syria during the disposal of 
PTAB 2.5Ms (anti-armor submunitions), a first explosion was 
followed several minutes later by a second or even third ex-
plosion—the longest period between first and last explosions 
being seven minutes. It is likely that these were caused by dif-
ferent components (nose fuze, base detonator) and the main fill 
exploding at different times. Given this is unlikely to happen 
during explosive demolition, the chances of such events are 
higher with thermite. The extended burning also mean there is 
an increased likelihood that materials surrounding the target 
will ignite, meaning a longer delay until the last smoke is seen 
and the soak period can commence. Thermite is therefore typi-
cally less time efficient than high explosive disposal.  
Work timings. As a consequence of the long soak period, op-
erations managers must consider cut-off times prior to the end 
of the working day for beginning a thermite disposal, par-
ticularly when teams have to leave a site by a certain time for 
safety and security reasons, such as driving at night. An hour 
is a good initial start point.
Protective works. Further consideration must be given 
when building protective works around thermite demolitions 
than when building them for use with explosives. With ther-
mite flares, the heat is liable to burn through sandbags. This 
means it is essential to use some material (e.g., plywood) as a 
roof above the burning area. If this is not done there is a risk 
that sand will spill over the flare and put it out before defla-
gration is complete, giving rise to obvious hazards. Protective 
works are harder to effectively build around a crucible initi-
ated disposal as the works need to be built up and over the 
crucible. In comparison, a thermite torch may often be laid 
flat beside or built into the protective works to attack the tar-
get. Usually with explosives, the ERW high orders and all that 
is left is a crater within the protective works. If the ERW low 
orders (as sometimes occurs with thermite), exposing the re-
sults is more hazardous as the remains of the ERW, which 
may contain sensitive explosives, are often buried below the 
protective works.
Rocket motors. Thermite is unsuitable for the disposal of 
rocket motors in normal circumstances because there is a sig-
nificant chance of igniting the propellant, thereby causing the 
rocket to move rapidly in an uncontrolled manner. Programs 
where rockets are present will need an alternative option. 
Cost. Although the relative costs of explosives, deto-
nators, detonator cords, and other items varies among 
countries, in general, the amount required for a single de-
molition will be a total of US$2–3, compared with $16 to 
$90 for a thermite system.5 A precise calculation for each 
country would have to include other factors such as the ad-
ditional storage and management costs for stocks of HE 
and ancillaries in order to give a true comparison. It should 
be noted that, typically, the cheaper thermite systems are 
only suitable for thinner-skinned items such as plastic anti- 
personnel mines, whereas targets such as artillery shells 
will require more expensive equipment. 
Bulk demolitions. Thermite is highly unsuited to bulk 
demolitions. The variation in the effects of burning on the 
nature of the initiation of the explosives in ERW mean that 
consistent propagation of sympathetic detonation cannot be 
guaranteed. The results of partially-initiated bulk demoli-
tions are extremely hazardous. 
Cluster munition carriers. Although in extremis, thermite 
could be used to attack a cluster munition carrier, there is a 
higher chance that submunitions will be kicked out and then 
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have to be dealt with one at a time, after which they may po-
tentially be in a more sensitive state than when in the par-
ent container. Very detailed planning and risk assessment is 
therefore required.
Multiple items in close proximity. In areas where numer-
ous items are gathered together (for example when gathered 
by locals), they cannot be targeted simultaneously by thermite 
as each item would probably initiate at different times, the first 
initiations potentially disrupting the setup of the remaining 
disposals. This could be addressed by the use of hook and line, 
or depending on the proximity and size of the items, by use of 
individual protective works; however, most of the time explo-
sives are the only means of conducting this operation cleanly.
Cluster munitions and other sensitive ERW (piezo, 
cocked strikers, etc.). These can be dealt with individually 
using thermite. The thermite torch lends itself best to this as 
it is a simple operation to align one next to the target, mini-
mizing the risk of accidental contact during preparation of 
the operation.
Shaped charges. These are designed to project a plasma 
jet or slug in a particular direction. They are used to concen-
trate the explosive effect to penetrate armor. The shape charge 
is usually a cone or a concave disc. Collapsing the cone or disc 
during disposal disrupts the formation of the energetic jet or 
slug and can only be achieved by explosive means. Thermite 
may still be used but consideration of the direction of travel, 
protective works, and evacuation are the main means of miti-
gation. These are still put in place when using explosives that 
are more likely to prevent the jet or slug forming in the first 
place. If possible, targeting thermite at the portion of the ex-
plosive fill closest to the stand-off will make it much less like-
ly that a high order resulting in the efficient formation of the 
plasma jet will occur.  
Initiation systems. Bridge-wire initiation systems do not 
work with all variations of exploder. If too much current pass-
es through the wire, it may break without heating the ignition 
mixture sufficiently. Other ignition systems have not proved 
100 percent reliable. 
Whenever ordering thermite systems, it is recommended to 
order an excess of initiators in order to allow for training and 
to provide spares in the case of operator error or system fail-
ure, as the particular starters required are unlikely to be avail-
able from other sources in-country, or easily replaced with a 
self-made alternative.
Identifying evidence of complete deflagration. Thermite 
systems may burn out an item and leave a hole with evidence 
of burning. It is difficult to confirm if all the explosive fill/det-
onator has burned out, requiring it to be attacked a second or 
third time (or potentially even more). It was also found where 
bare fuzes are attacked with thermite, the booster may func-
tion but the detonator does not, requiring a second attack (if 
the fuze is unarmed the detonator may well be out of line with 
the booster and therefore protected from its effect). 
Small vs. large items. Generally, items of 57 mm or below 
high ordered, while larger items deflagrated (unless the fuze 
or booster were deliberately attacked). 
Violent deflagration and low-order detonation. On some 
munitions, energetic low-order events were observed, re-
sulting in explosive components and filling being dispersed, 
This image shows a 25 lb HE shell attacked using a mol-
ten penetrator. The conical shape of the entry did not 
allow sufficient escape of gases during deflagration to 
completely prevent explosion; however, it is clear that the 
detonation that did occur lacked the violence of a high-
order event.
Image courtesy of Chris Cooper.
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IED Threat Consistency and Predictability in Fallujah: A ‘Simple Model’ for Clearance by Wilkinson  [ from page 7 ]
1. Fallujah is located in the center of the map, bordered on the west by the Tigris River. Baghdad lies approximately 65 km to the east, the 
direction of approach for an Iraqi Security Force advance.
2. UNMAS (Iraq) IMSMA database.
3. IMSMA is the UNMAS Information System for Mine Action and is the repository of all data and reporting on EH within (in this case) 
the Iraqi area of operations.
4. UNMAS (Iraq) IMSMA database.
5. Ibid.
6. Taken from: https://iedawareness.com/2017/12/15/improvised-switches-found-in-libya/ accessed on 3 Feb 19.
7. For further details on this detector see https://www.minelab.com/mea/metal-detectors/countermine-detectors/f3-compact.
IEDs and Urban Clearance Variables in Mosul: Defining Complex Environments by Wilkinson [ from page 13 ]
1. For comparison, see “IED Threat Consistency, Predictability Suggest a ‘Simple’ Model for Clearance.”
2. United Nations Joint Analysis Unit.
3. Abu Hasan al-Muhaji, ISIS spokesperson. 18 March 2019. Message urging Sunnis in Syria and Iraq to join the “Caliphate,” and the and 
the supporters of the group abroad are called to launch attacks on “infidels.” Analysts interpret his quote, “The capital of the Caliphate, 
Baghdad, will never be Shiite” as an indication that the focus of the group will continue to be on Iraq. Translated read-out by UNAMI 
Joint Analysis Unit, Baghdad.
4. Ibid.
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which required another attack. The results of this event are 
potentially more dangerous than the state of the ERW as it is 
initially found, requiring more care to find and expose com-
ponents. This situation is less likely when using explosives.
PTAB 2.5M. The nose fuze, main filling, and base detona-
tor may react independently with up to three separate explo-
sions heard after one attack. The longest time observed from 
the first to the last explosion on one event was seven minutes, 
but the typical period was two to four minutes. They generally 
low ordered as did most shaped charge munitions. 
CONCLUSION
Thermite systems are a useful option for operators. There 
are plenty of idiosyncrasies to its use, and hopefully the points 
in this article will allow those using it in the future to improve 
safety and efficiency issues. In any country, it is probable that 
there will be circumstances in which thermite is not appropri-
ate. If these issues are identified then development of further 
non-explosive techniques to deal with such problems will lead 
to operators relying less on HE. This will, in contexts such as 
Yemen and Syria, as well as many other places in the future, 
give significant benefits in terms of operational reach. Further 
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engagement with manufacturers, development of new tech-
niques, and support from donors should increase the effec-
tiveness of the use of thermite. 
See endnotes page 63
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Rendsafe and Gary Fenton of Disarmco for providing addition-
al information.
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